

THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE AFRICAN FAMINE, 1984-1986
Vol. II

AN ANALYSIS OF POLICY FORMATION
AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

AID PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT NO. 17
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FOREWORD

The 1984-1986 drought in Africa resulted in the continent's most severe famine in recorded history. Countless lives were saved by the massive outpouring of assistance from around the world. The U.S. response to this crisis was larger than that of any other donor nation as a result of the concerted efforts of numerous government agencies, private voluntary organizations, businesses, and U.S. citizens.

This two-volume assessment was commissioned to reflect on and record the lessons learned from our response to the emergency. Volume I, *An Evaluation of the Emergency Food Assistance Program: Synthesis Report*, is a detailed examination of U.S.-financed food assistance in Mali, Chad, and Sudan. Volume II, *An Analysis of Policy Formation and Program Management*, focuses on policy and management issues including legislation and funding, early warning systems, donor relations, the role of the commercial sector, public and congressional relations, and the transition to development.

The lessons learned from this emergency should guide us in responding to such disasters and provide insights for determining the actions necessary to abate the ravages of future droughts.

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PREFACE

The African drought and its accompanying famine during the years 1984, 1985, and 1986 were among the worst in the history of that continent. Governments, international organizations, private voluntary agencies, and ordinary citizens gave generously of their resources and time to reduce the death rate, sickness, and displacement that followed. The media brought the facts into

sharp focus on television and in print. Concerts raised millions of dollars in assistance through "Band-Aid," "Live Aid," "Northern Lights," and similar events. Record sales and sports events added vast sums. Amidst all these activities, the contributions of the U.S. Government loomed largest, totaling over \$2 billion in food, supplies, transportation, and personnel. Despite some initial delays, there is no doubt that the U.S. effort, along with the efforts of other donors, saved countless lives and made life at least bearable for millions more who had been at risk.

Many of those who were most deeply involved in the U.S. effort realized that few of the lessons learned from similar previous emergencies had been applied in the present one. The Agency for International Development (AID) determined to correct at least the mistake of failing to learn from the past (as have many other organizations, international and bilateral). It commissioned studies by two contractors to seek out and record the lessons learned. One, prepared by Devres Inc., is a synthesis of a detailed examination of U.S.-financed food emergency activities in Mali, Chad, and the Sudan.^{1} To provide Washington and international donor community perspectives, AID contracted with Development Associates. The scope of work for this study was written largely by the first deputy director for operations of the Inter-Agency Task Force established in AID to coordinate the U.S. Government response.

It is too soon to assess the overall impact of U.S. assistance, although that task should begin within 6 months. However, a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee staff report of April 1986 on refugee and famine conditions in Ethiopia and Sudan had high praise for the efforts of the international donor community, led by AID, in saving lives in both countries. The total number of lives saved will never be known with certainty, but to estimate it in the millions is not to exaggerate the effect of providing hundreds of thousands of metric tons of vitally needed food.

This report concentrates on policy formation and overall management, including managerial and organizational problems, information systems, coordination, early warning systems, and the transition to development. The aim is to prepare for handling the next such calamity. What worked and could or should be repeated? What techniques or systems should be avoided in the future? What should be included next time that was overlooked in this situation? Finally, and perhaps most important, what actions should be taken now and in the near future to forestall the ravages of similar calamities?

Methodology. To accomplish the task, members of a four-person team interviewed members of the Inter-Agency Task Force; Congressional staff; officers and administrators in AID; the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, State, and Treasury; the National Security Council; the U.S. Public Health Service; the Centers for Disease Control; the United Nations Office of Emergency Operations for Africa; and many private voluntary organizations. The team also interviewed those who

traditionally do the interviewing: members of the press. In Ottawa, one team member talked with officers in Canada's Africa Emergency Aid organization and representatives of nongovernmental organizations; in Geneva, another interviewed representatives of the League of Red Cross Societies, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. In Rome, he contacted the World Food Program, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, and the U.S. Mission to the International Food Agencies; in Brussels, the U.S. Mission to the European Economic Community (EEC) and the EEC itself.

Another member of the team traveled to Abidjan to obtain the views of staff in the Regional Development Office for West Africa and thence to Ethiopia where he talked with members of the AID food assistance staff, officials in the Ethiopian Government's Refugee and Relief Commission, and private voluntary agencies. Finally, he attended a conference in Nairobi held under the auspices of the U.N. Office of Emergency Assistance to Africa to consider the lessons to be learned by both donors and recipients.

The team had access to scores of documents from many organizations and entities and has drawn on those for background information and to substantiate specific data. The team is indebted to AID's Library in its Center for Development information and Evaluation (CDIE) for supplying many of those documents. The bibliography lists the materials reviewed.

Special thanks go to W. Haven North, AID's Associate Assistant Administrator, CDIE, and Ted Morse, Director of the Drought Coordination Staff in AID's Africa Bureau and formerly deputy director for operations on the Inter-Agency Task Force, for their encouragement and support, and to Sandra Malone-Gilmer in CDIE for her coordinating efforts.

Finally, the team acknowledges with thanks the time given by scores of persons here and overseas. Many of their constructive comments received on the first and second drafts have been considered in this final version.

{1}It is being published as a companion volume to this report (The U.S. Response to the African Famine, 1984-1986. Vol. I. An Evaluation of the Emergency Food Assistance Program: Synthesis Report. AID Program Evaluation Report No. 16. Washington, D.C.: AID, November 1986.) The individual country studies of Chad, Mali, and Sudan will be published as AID Evaluation Special Studies.

SUMMARY

Purpose of Study. The 1984-1986 drought caused Africa's greatest famine in recorded history. At the same time, it elicited AID's single largest emergency assistance effort. AID

commissioned this study to derive recommendations on how to do the job more efficiently next time.

Methodology. To record successful responses, measures to be avoided, and new steps that should be applied in future efforts, the review team interviewed participants in the relief operations in Washington and abroad and reviewed a variety of literature and working documents.

Overall Conclusions

1. Neither donors nor recipients have yet learned how to avoid deaths that result from drought in Africa.
2. The interval between droughts in Africa appears to be shrinking.
3. As the President's coordinator for famine relief, the AID Administrator effectively mobilized and coordinated relevant U.S. Government resources.
4. The U.S. Government's massive efforts, combined with those of other donors, private voluntary agencies, and host countries, saved countless thousands of lives and reduced the suffering of millions.
5. The vast rescue operations owe their success to the dedication, professionalism, and tireless work of all those associated in the effort.
6. Heeding early warnings and making faster policy decisions would have further increased the effectiveness of relief operations.
7. Greater concern by some host countries for their suffering populations would have reduced the severity of the crisis and spared additional victims.
8. It is incumbent on the donor community and host governments to work together to continue their efforts to combat the systemic causes of famine: skewed economic policies, lagging agricultural production, high birth rates, and practices that degrade the environment and upset the ecological balance.
9. The major impediment to better and faster distribution of assistance in the 1984-1986 drought crisis was the same as in the 1973-1974 Sahel drought crisis: the weakness of African transportation and logistics systems.

Recommendations

1. Policy Concerns for the Future

- In an emergency, AID management should ensure that the requirements of "business as usual" and the

emergency do not conflict. To accomplish this, specific guidelines delineating Agency priorities and a followup system are required.

- There is ample precedent from past famine crises for policymakers to defer political reservations to the immediate task of saving lives. Life-saving decisions must be made in a timely manner, even while attempts are being made to ease political concerns.
- The decision to provide humanitarian assistance at 50 percent of perceived needs must be considered as flexible in order to accommodate situational requirements. The mode for providing humanitarian assistance should not depend on past practice or arbitrary decisions but on the most efficient and reliable channels available. Similarly, the U.S. profile will vary from country to country, depending on the cooperativeness of other donors and the host country. The amount of emergency assistance need not depend on the amount of regular U.S. program assistance.

2. Legislation and Funding

- AID should develop a plan for addressing a future famine by reviewing the various legislative authorities it can draw upon.
- When an initial or updated review of resources to be made available shows that AID cannot address famine needs at the level of a U.S. commitment or that resources moved from any category to address the famine should be replenished, AID should promptly request a supplemental appropriation from Congress.
- To avoid delays in the use of appropriated supplemental funds, AID, as the Administration representative, should submit plans to Congress while legislation is pending that show how supplemental funds will be used.
- In future requests, AID should again encourage Congress to appropriate a portion of supplemental funds for the management of program activities to be supported by those funds.

3. Early Warning Systems

- Host countries must become convinced that early warning system efforts are in their own interest.
- African governments and regional organizations must become fully involved in early warning system design and operation.

- AID should encourage and finance the further development of the Africa Bureau's Famine Early Warning System project.
- For the present, such development should remain the operating responsibility of the Africa Bureau, with financial and information inputs from other bureaus such as Science and Technology and the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). Data base development and coordination should be the responsibility of the Center for Development Information and Evaluation of the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
- The Africa Bureau should set a high priority on providing necessary technical assistance to African governments to improve their abilities to gather, preserve, analyze, and react to early warning data.
- Donors should convoke meetings with host governments to achieve agreement on the definition and composition of an early warning system.
- Donors should reduce duplication of early warning system functions by agreeing on specific technical and financial contributions.
- Donors and host countries should agree on annual action plans, including (1) joint multidonor/host country assessments midway in the rainy season to determine likely minimum needs in order to ensure that first relief shipments arrive by January, (2) joint multidonor postharvest missions to refine estimates and determine residual relief requirements, and (3) multidonor logistic missions to assess infrastructure and possible limitations on timely relief distributions.
- During emergencies, needs assessments should focus first on time frames during which relief can actually reach populations at risk.
- Early warning system data should be fully utilized as an important contribution to development planning.
- AID should mandate that Country Development Strategy Statements and annual Action Plans for drought-prone countries contain an explicit discussion of early warning systems and their role in host country and USAID development planning.
- AID and other donors should establish time-phased evaluation plans for their own early warning system projects that focus on (1) the technical effectiveness and cost/benefits of the system, particularly with regard to acceptable "triggering" indicia; (2)

improvements in international cooperation and coordination; (3) progress in the "Africanization" of early warning system activities; and (4) utilization of early warning systems as a development planning tool.

4. Coordinating the U.S. Government Response

- In the event of another crisis approaching the magnitude of the 1984-1986 African famine, the President should again publicly announce that the AID Administrator will serve as his Special Coordinator.
- In a future crisis, an interagency task force should be established in AID under the leadership of the geographic bureau concerned to coordinate the Government's response.
- Timing depends on a confluence of factors indicating the necessity for wider U.S. Government participation.
- The team responsible for the course on disaster operations given to OFDA staff, or for a related predecessor course, should aid in the creation of the action group that will handle the next longer term emergency and help to formulate its operating procedures.
- Because of the different philosophies of AID and the State Department Bureau for Refugee Programs on how assistance should be channeled to recipients, steps should be taken before the next emergency to work out a mutually satisfactory approach for situations involving feeding of refugees and non-refugees in the same groupings. Clarifying guidelines should be issued, if needed, for determining appropriate rations for refugees in those situations.
- In a similar emergency, the assets of other U.S. departments and bureaus should again be fully utilized by AID, but with a better sense of mission.

5. Implementation

- AID should evaluate the World Food Program system designed to assist drought-prone countries in developing inventories of their transportation facilities and assets, including periodic updates on quantity and condition, and should be prepared to give financial assistance to the effort.
- Multidonor missions should identify vital transportation links such as roads and bridges

whose condition caused bottlenecks during this past crisis. Donors should then set priorities with recipient countries for improving and upgrading links that are particularly prone to repeated failure, taking into consideration maintenance costs and the amount of "normal" traffic these links carry.

- After the AID Office of Food for Peace (FFP) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) review with the Maritime Administration the six recommendations in the latter's March 1986 report on potential

agricultural transportation cost reductions and other options, FFP should take steps to institute those found to be feasible.

- The Department of State and AID should examine agreements they have with West African littoral countries to identify those that would permit negotiation of provisions for expedited duty-free passage of humanitarian assistance from ports to landlocked countries, then negotiate such provisions.
- Simultaneously, the United States should consider asking the Organization of African Unity or the Economic Commission of West African States to convene a committee for the purpose of drafting regional compacts providing for expedited duty-free shipment of humanitarian assistance from whatever source between and among countries.
- The AID Personnel Office should program its computerized personnel system to quickly identify onboard personnel with pertinent emergency experience.
- The AID Office of Procurement should provide managers with a summary of methods for quickly mobilizing assistance from personnel in the private sector and in other agencies in times of emergencies.
- Courses at the Foreign Service Institute and the Senior Seminar should include material on managing natural and human-caused disasters.
- Based on recent General Accounting Office reports, FFP and USDA should take steps to effect the recommendations concerning acceleration of the approval, procurement, and shipping of emergency food.
- FFP should develop plans now for closer monitoring of emergency food shipments to recipients.

6. Donor Relations

- AID and other donors should define and determine

their degree of interest in coordination in general and in specific areas before a disaster hits; they should redefine those relationships in terms of operational necessities later.

- The effectiveness of the U.N. Office of Emergency Operations in Africa in the latter stages of the crisis speaks for the replication of this model in any future emergency.
- Donors should tailor their coordinating mechanisms in each stricken country to the resources that could be marshaled by donors and host countries.
- Round tables involving donor and host country policy and expert staffs should define the need for technical contributions and how such contributions could be collated. Technical experts should agree on methodologies, criteria, and level of effort. Policy-level officials should consider the consolidation and financing of these various efforts.
- After consultations with host governments, donors should consider designating lead agencies for specific subjects.
- AID/Washington should ensure that U.S. representatives are detailed to multidonor missions so that conclusions will be based on common premises.

7. The Role of Private Voluntary Organizations and the Commercial Sector

- To make more effective use of the varied abilities and interests of U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in the next crisis, in-country coordinating mechanisms must be developed, preferably by the host government; in the alternative, coordination must be headed by international organizations or PVOs themselves.
- A joint AID-PVO group should be established in Washington for coordination and proposal screening purposes.
- Block grant allocations should be made to USAID Missions for rapid funding of PVO proposals up to \$250,000.
- In selected instances, AID should consider making block grants directly to PVOs.
- AID should initially divide project funds equally into relief and recovery categories to provide flexibility and establish country priorities.

- AID should maintain a flexible policy with respect to the use of authorized Commodity Credit Corporation funds for inland transportation of food during emergencies. Any decision should take into consideration funds raised by PVOs from appeals related to an ongoing crisis.
- PVO requests to distribute food shipments should include details of available transportation assets and anticipated shortages.
- AID should review options for expanding the role of the U.S. commercial sector in providing transportation and logistics services in a future emergency.
- AID should commission a survey of relevant U.S. firms to develop a famine-assistance resource inventory that can be drawn upon in a future crisis.
- AID should foster the creation of a system for channeling U.S. corporate resources into efforts to eliminate world hunger.

8. Public and Congressional Relations

- AID and the Department of State should develop a comprehensive public affairs strategy when an emergency is recognized and the decision is made that the United States will respond. That strategy should be revised as circumstances change.
- Guidance regarding press contact should be given to AID/Washington and field personnel immediately after there is agreement that the United States will respond to a famine. That guidance should be revised if the U.S. response extends over more than 6 months.
- In addition to fulfilling specific Congressional reporting requirements, AID should initiate information sharing with Congress through the use of briefings and fact sheets.
- Responsibility for preparation of fact sheets should be given to the Development Planning Office of AID's Bureau for Africa.
- AID should include examples of U.S. successes and evidence of the impact of U.S. assistance on recipients in the materials sent out in response to public inquiries. These materials should also acknowledge problems, even if the problems have received substantial press coverage.
- AID should encourage PVOs to acknowledge U.S. Government contributions in their press interviews

and in their brochures, and AID should acknowledge and illustrate the extent of private efforts in the materials it issues to the public.

- AID should actively seek press coverage for non-emergency topics like famine prevention.
- AID should continue its participation in the annual World Food Day event sponsored by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization.
- A common data base system should be adopted by AID's Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance Bureau, Office of Food for Peace, OFDA, the relevant regional bureau, the State Department Bureau for Refugee Programs, and even USDA's Stabilization and Conservation Service to record the distribution of all resources in a new famine emergency.

9. Transition to development

- Drought-prone countries should establish or strengthen early warning systems as a matter of high national priority for both famine prevention and development planning.
- Fullest participation by host countries and regional organizations should lead to the earliest possible "Africanization" of the systems.
- Donors (including AID) should limit their early warning system assistance to elements that surpass host countries' and regional organizations' technical and financial capabilities. Donors should regularly review the capabilities of the host countries and regional organizations to determine what additional improvements are needed.
- Host governments, AID, and other donors should agree on data collection and assessment criteria and methodologies to avoid duplication and to establish common premises.
- Studies should be conducted of African countries that were considered success stories despite drought and famine conditions.
- Host governments should, as a matter of high priority, design their own disaster preparedness plans, perhaps building on the existing local Red Cross/ Crescent Chapters.
- Offers of preparedness assistance by specialized organizations such as Licross, the U.N. Disaster Relief Office, and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees should be utilized, when possible, in

preference to the commitment of scarce U.S. resources.

- Preparedness plans should include standby food-for-work projects. USAID Missions should monitor their design (the World Food Program's Bangladesh experience could be pertinent).
- USAID Missions should insist on the importance of preparedness in policy dialogues with their host country.
- As soon as emergency conditions are over, development plans should be reviewed to ensure that first priority is placed on "drought and famine proofing." Highest emphasis should be given to food production projects.
- To ensure survival of donor-supported activities in host countries, AID (and other donors) should insist that they become fully integrated into the public service and the operating budget prior to project termination.
- Assistance levels for drought-prone countries should take into consideration the degree of a country's priority on anti-drought/famine measures.
- African governments should review laws and regulations that impeded relief operations and the need for standby authorities. An African organization should convoke meetings to resolve regional issues.
- To provide for a concerted, long-range developmental attack on the causes of famine in Africa and to lessen the burden on individual donors, an international task force should be established under the aegis of the World Bank or the U.N. Secretary-General. The task force should be composed of African and donor government representatives, private experts, and representatives of governments that have been successful in combating famine in their own countries.

GLOSSARY

APPER - Africa's Priority Program for Economic Recovery

CCC - Commodity Credit Corporation

CDC - Centers for Disease Control

CDIE - Center for Development Information and Evaluation, AID

CIDA - Canadian International Development Agency

CILSS - Interstate Committee for the Fight Against Drought

DCS - Drought Coordination Staff, AID Bureau for Africa

DoD - U.S. Department of Defense

EEC - European Economic Community

FAA - U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

FAO - U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization

FFP - Food for Peace Office, AID

FVA - Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance, AID

GAO - General Accounting Office

ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross

NOAA - National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration

OECD - Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development

OFDA - Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, AID

OMB - U.S. Office of Management and Budget

OSRO - U.N. Office of Sahelian Relief Operations

PPC - Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, AID

PVO - Private Voluntary Organizations

S&T - Bureau for Science and Technology, AID

UNDP - U.N. Development Program

UNDRO - U.N. Disaster Relief Office

UNHCR - U.N. High Commission for Refugees

UNOEOA - U.N. Office of Emergency Operations in Africa

USDA - U.S. Department of Agriculture

USIA - U.S. Information Agency

WFP - U.N. World Food Program

WMO - World Meteorological Organization

1. BACKGROUND

1.1 The Past

The world is no stranger to drought and famine. No continent has escaped. Even the United States fell victim to a drought that created the infamous Dust Bowl of the early 1930s. But Africa has suffered repeatedly and tragically.

The 1984-1986 drought, the subject of this report, was by far the most serious of the century. It outstrips in magnitude and death the 1973-1974 drought in the Sahel and Ethiopia and the 1915-1916 drought in the Sahel (Kates et al. 1975). Millions of lives were at risk; livestock herds were decimated and the environment was further degraded. More than a score of countries were eventually directly affected, including once more the Sahel countries and Ethiopia. By contrast, only seven countries experienced famine in 1973-1974. In the mid-1960s, Nigeria suffered a severe drought that was exacerbated by civil unrest and the movement of thousands of refugees. In 1980-1982, drought worsened the plight of refugees in Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia.

During the existence of the Agency for International Development (AID) and its predecessor agencies, the U.S. Government has responded generously, usually leading other bilateral and international donors. The form and style of its response mode has varied little.

In the Biafran crisis in Nigeria, an experienced ex-diplomat was recalled by the Department of State to oversee the relief effort, which was a combined undertaking of the State Department and AID. For the 1973-1974 Sahel-Ethiopia drought, a special Drought Emergency Office was created, an interagency task force was formed, and the Deputy AID Administrator was appointed by the President to be the Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief. The first contingency funds began flowing in April 1973, with sponsorship of the first major in-country airlifts of food to the region. Small task groups were sent to Dakar and Lagos to handle special port problems. AID conducted a regionwide survey of potential rehabilitation efforts and devised procedures for expediting a multimillion dollar Relief and Recovery Program. There was maximum cooperation with the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the U.N. Office of Sahelian Relief Operations. AID experimented with new food routing systems, for example from Algerian ports to outlying areas of Mali and Niger. By the end of calendar year 1974, AID had made available over \$216 million in food and drought-related assistance. Over \$92 million in nonfood assistance was provided from a special appropriation for assistance to the African drought and \$4.6 million in contingency funds. Food commitments totaled 573,000 metric tons.

During the 1979-1981 refugee crisis in Somalia, assistance efforts were coordinated by the Department of State, with a special interagency task force operating under the then newly created Office of the Coordinator for Refugee Assistance. AID

was an active participant in that effort. At that time AID had Missions or representatives in all the affected countries; the refugee coordinator was generally a State Department officer.

1.2 The Present

In this most recent crisis, AID again turned to an inter-agency task force, a mechanism that had served well in the past. The President publicly announced the appointment of the AID Administrator as the Special Coordinator. Formed in the fall of 1984 under the direction of the then Director of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in AID, the Inter-Agency Task Force included representatives from 13 U.S. Government agencies and served as a forum for sharing information. Management and coordination of more than \$2 billion in food and nonfood assistance was undertaken by the State Department/AID Task Force. (For full details, see Section 5.)

The State Department/AID Task Force was phased out in the fall of 1985 as the crisis eased, and its action and coordination functions were absorbed in the Africa Bureau by the Drought Coordination Staff, which itself was phased out in May 1986. The Inter-Agency Task Force was disbanded in April 1986. Remaining relief and recovery activities are being undertaken by the line offices in the Africa Bureau, the AID Food for Peace Office (FFP), and OFDA in a continuation of their normal responsibilities. The Africa Bureau has appointed a special assistant for drought and famine preparedness to ensure timely and targeted response to future threats of famine.

1.3 The Future

Of all the lessons to be garnered from the past, none is more important or pressing than to admit that neither donors nor recipients have yet learned how to avoid the spectre of the hundreds of thousands of deaths that result from droughts in Africa. And it is not for lack of trying. Witness the massive efforts made by AID in the wake of the 1973-1974 Sahel drought -- new legislative authority and millions of dollars were made available by Congress.

A Sahel Consultative Group was established to further donor cooperation; the Interstate Committee for the Fight Against Drought was formed to represent the interests of the Sahel countries. In particular, efforts were made to target the specific causes of famine. Some improvements have been noted. Deaths in the Sahel resulting from the recent drought were lower than in 1973-1974. In this crisis, port operations in the Sahel were much improved, and some countries had better disaster-coordinating mechanisms in place. Sophisticated early warning mechanisms provided more timely signs of oncoming difficulties, and donor responses were more generous than ever.

But population growth still outstrips the growth of

agricultural production, the desert advances further each year, and the ecology is more out of balance than ever; even the interval between droughts appears to be shrinking. Civil strife, foreign debt burdens, and general economic problems usurp African officials' time and attention.

There is no magic solution or panacea; some ideas are presented in Section 10 for ensuring that famine problems are addressed as part of AID and African country development planning. The danger is that other priorities will intrude as the world turns to business as usual. To minimize that danger, an international approach is also discussed in Section 10.

2. POLICY CONCERNS FOR THE FUTURE

Operational issues that may face future managers of AID famine assistance in a similar crisis are treated at length in the balance of this report. During the course of the study, three policy issues were identified that deserve special mention: management concerns unique to an emergency, assistance to "unfriendly" countries, and the level and mode of U.S. humanitarian assistance.

2.1 Management In Emergencies

Action Recommendation: In an emergency, AID management should ensure that the requirements of "business as usual" and those of the emergency do not conflict. To accomplish this, specific guidelines delineating Agency priorities and a followup system are required.

The delivery of over \$2 billion in U.S. assistance to Africa in a 3-year period is testimony to the abilities and dedication of those who organized, coordinated, and managed that effort. It required the maximum effort and involvement of individuals from the AID Administrator in Washington to food monitors in the field. Resources of AID bureaus, offices, and USAID Missions, already committed to long-range development, were often diverted to relief and recovery. To its credit, AID managed the crisis and its ongoing development program with a minimum of conflict between the two. That which did occur arose primarily from demands for instant action made on a system generally geared to a more considered pace.

The Administrator made the famine effort AID's first priority and exemplified this decision by his own efforts. But the assumption that a large organization will respond with alacrity to example and some knowledge about the activities of another segment of that organization is not always warranted, even in a crisis. This is particularly true when the crisis is managed by a specially created unit like a task force, which is perceived to be outside the mainstream. Lines of authority become uncertain, and jurisdictional concerns inevitably arise.

The charter of the Inter-Agency Task Force defined its goals and objectives, but not its powers. Some of that confusion could be avoided in the next crisis by issuing clear guidelines concerning its authorities and powers. In addition, AID offices should be alerted to the possibility that demands might be made on their personnel and resources and that positive responses would be expected. To support and give credence to such possibilities, a two-way information flow is necessary. Management should ensure that ample information about the crisis is passed to the staff on a frequent basis through directives and notices. Anticipated problems should be highlighted, particularly if they will affect staff requirements. In-house newsletters and bulletins should be used, as before, to inform AID staff in general about its activities during a future crisis.

The task force should be responsible for keeping senior AID staff informed about its activities on a systematic basis, emphasizing actions necessary to avoid delays in the delivery of assistance and to overcome other problems. The open-door policy that existed between the Administrator and the Inter-Agency Task Force Chairman was clearly valuable, but a formal system is needed to ensure proper action by responsible offices and individuals.

One method is the establishment of a small secretariat, with duties similar to those of AID's Executive Secretariat. The secretariat would make action assignments and would have the authority to take followup steps to ensure compliance. This would be more effective if the task force were a single-action group, not the three-tiered structure developed for this crisis.

2.2 Assistance to Populations in "Unfriendly" Countries

Action Recommendation: There is ample precedent from past famine crises for policymakers to defer political reservations to the immediate task of saving lives. Life-saving decisions must be made in a timely manner, even while attempts are being made to ease political concerns.

America prides itself on providing humanitarian assistance to those in need without dwelling on factors other than the amount required. This was demonstrated in this century when Herbert Hoover headed relief efforts in Germany and other European countries after World War I. The Marshall Plan after World War II repeated that effort on a grander scale. But an important political consideration underlay that decision: to enable Europe, including the former Axis powers, to form an economic and defensive bulwark against the USSR.

In this famine crisis, policymakers faced the issue of providing assistance to three affected countries that were aligned with Russia: Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola. When the first evidence of the extensive suffering in Ethiopia came to the attention of the United States, the initial response of the

Administration and Congress was mixed. The Marxist regime's heavy involvement with the Soviet Union, typified by arms purchases and the expenditure of an estimated \$200 million for its 10th anniversary celebration (Newsweek, November 26, 1984, 54), made its motives suspect. There was a reluctance to send U.S. assistance only to save Ethiopia's foreign exchange, which it should have been spending to import and transport sorely needed food. Added to this was the realization that the Ethiopian Government had not publicly recognized the devastating effects of the drought, although a potentially serious food shortage existed in the northern provinces in late 1982. By March and April 1984, the U.S. Embassy was reporting the failure of the spring rains; the FAO reported crop failures in May of that year.

A General Accounting Office report to Congress in April 1985 illustrates the problems that faced policymakers: concerns about the ability of the Government and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) to carry out food programs that would reach the needy; sensitivity about committing large amounts of food assistance to a closed government where detailed and accurate verifications of food needs could not be accomplished and where the possibility of food diversion existed (which was alleged later, but not proven); rebel activity in the northern provinces; and the lack of an AID presence in the country. The report noted in this connection 5- and 6-month delays by AID in approving two modest requests for food made by Catholic Relief Services in late 1982 and again in 1983.

When it was clear that the rains had failed and crops were lost, the United States provided nearly \$500 million in assistance to Ethiopia and its refugees in FY 1985, leading all other donors (and by its example embarrassing the Soviet Union into providing some trucks and airplanes for food transport). At the request of the President, the AID Administrator traveled to Ethiopia in November 1984 to assess the situation; he sounded warnings of what lay in store not only for that country but for other countries as well. Although part of the U.S. response may have been due to pressure from Congress and the press, in the end it was the response to human suffering that mobilized support.

A Senate Judiciary Committee subcommittee report on Ethiopia and Sudan found that as of April 1986, U.S.-led international assistance saved the lives of over 7 million men, women, and children and that "Ethiopia has been pulled back from the brink of what threatened to become one of the great human tragedies of modern times" (U.S. Senate April 1986). The report authors also found that an "extraordinarily pro-American sentiment remains alive in Ethiopia" despite the "frigid" diplomatic relations that exist between the United States and Ethiopia.

Mozambique presented different problems. The decision to respond was easier because humanitarian concerns and U.S. national interests coalesced. Mozambique suffered severely from drought and cyclones from 1981 to 1984 and a violent rural insurgency that disrupted communication links and distribution networks. Because Mozambique was under Marxist leadership,

debates about whether the United States should provide assistance created several months' delay. Once the humanitarian decision was made, Title II food to the hungry in Mozambique moved quickly.

Despite internal problems, the Government of Mozambique satisfactorily distributed donor relief aid. It created a separate relief department and gave it highest priority; the military provided security for delivering food to insecure areas; the Government purchased grain from surplus areas, distributed seeds, and assisted in coordinating shipping and off-loading emergency supplies. Donor coordination was improved, particularly under the direction of a specially appointed U.N. Development Program coordinator. AID has a small office there administering a modest development and recovery program.

In the case of Angola, the United States had been contributing to an emergency assistance program under World Food Program (WFP) sponsorship for several years. At the time of famine conditions through much of Africa, the issue was raised about whether that program should be continued. The decision was made to continue the program, and sponsorship of the program was transferred to UNICEF. These actions did not interrupt the flow of commodities to Angola under the program.

Even when the initial decision is made to provide humanitarian assistance, events in the host country may again call the decision into question. In the case of Ethiopia, several bills are pending in Congress to cut off food aid because the Government is engaged in forced resettlement using donated food as the "incentive." A Washington Post editorial of April 27, 1986, noted an additional dilemma facing the Administration: whether to cut off food aid and arm the insurgents because the worst of the famine had passed. The Senate subcommittee report noted above found that the much-criticized forced resettlement program had been suspended and that the Ethiopian authorities, acknowledging the validity of many of the problems raised by others, have announced a major family reunification and tracing program in the resettlement areas. But it also found that the "villagization" program has disrupted some areas and concludes that the Ethiopian Government should be aware that Western donors, including the United States, "will hardly look favorably upon requests for future food assistance if the implementation of the villagization program becomes part of the problem."

Although it may yet fall to the lot of this Administration to face similar situations, future administrations may count on it. There is ample precedent in this and previous responses to human suffering to justify timely and positive responses in the future. There is little doubt about the individual American's attitude if the millions of dollars given to "Live Aid," "Band Aid," and other fund-raising activities can be taken as valid indicators. Political realities will intrude and must be dealt with, but the decision in each case should be in favor of relieving suffering while attempting to ease political strains.

2.3 The Level and Mode of Emergency Famine Assistance

Action Recommendation: The decision to provide humanitarian assistance at 50 percent of perceived needs must be considered as flexible in order to accommodate situational requirements. The mode for providing humanitarian assistance should not depend on past practice or arbitrary decisions but on the most efficient and reliable channels available. Similarly, the U.S. profile will vary from country to country, depending on the cooperativeness of other donors and the host country. The amount of emerging assistance need not depend on the amount of regular U.S. program assistance.

During this crisis, the United States attempted to limit its food emergency assistance generally to 50 percent of the total food need. Total U.S. food assistance provided ranged from one-third in some countries to over 80 percent in the Sudan, where an influx of over 300,000 refugees from Ethiopia in 1985 alone strained local capacities beyond their limits. The 50-percent food target is not entirely arbitrary -- it accords with what the United States has generally provided in the past with Congressional approval, while leaving ample room for initiatives on the part of other donors and host countries. Announcing the U.S. food target in advance enables others to understand what goals they should set for fund raising and level of effort. The 50-percent figure may be used by the United States to assert leadership in a given situation or defer to the leadership of another donor. But as this crisis has demonstrated, flexibility should be maintained for lowering or raising that figure. It may be important that the United States use its capability to respond rapidly in the first months of a famine crisis, leaving the sorting out of donor shares until the situation has stabilized.

There are several methods of providing humanitarian assistance. The State Department Bureau for Refugee Programs provides assistance largely through contributions to international organizations such as the U.N. High Commission for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross, but it also utilizes PVOs. The Department's International Organizations budget made \$1.4 million available to the U.N. Office of Emergency Operations in Africa (UNOEOA) for operating expenses. PL 480 Title II emergency food is provided on a government-to-government basis, directly to PVOs for transport and distribution, and to the WFP. AID's Office of Food for Peace (FFP) is seeking ways to increase the involvement of the non-PVO private sector in food shipment and distribution.

AID has traditionally preferred the bilateral approach for its development assistance, using international organizations for special situations, such as working with the World Bank in funding joint projects. Because it has Missions in countries receiving development assistance, AID has depended on its own resources both to give and to monitor assistance. This preference was evident during the drought crisis, particularly in

Sudan. There could be political advantage in AID's maintaining its usual style, particularly where it wants to ensure its ongoing relationships with a country in the after-crisis period. But as its personnel resources decrease, AID will have to rely increasingly on the abilities and experience of other organizations.

In the past, Congress has urged the "internationalization" of assistance. The advantages are there: international organizations absorb negative political fallout more easily than bilateral donors; they can often bring more pressure to bear on a host government; and they are viewed as more "neutral" than bilateral givers. Many developed increased respect for their operations in this crisis. There is no doubt that over the years AID officials have developed some antipathy toward international organizations, an attitude that needs rethinking. International agencies judged to have shortcomings in the past have made substantial advances in overcoming weaknesses. For example, senior staff at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research Service consider FAO to be much more capable of assessing food needs in developing countries. UNOEOA's coordination of U.N. agency operations in Africa has led to many requests to extend its existence beyond March 1986. It is now scheduled to be dissolved on October 31, 1986. The United States encouraged the creation of the UNOEOA and provided funds to support its activities.

This study does not examine whether AID should further internationalize its regular development programs. It does suggest, however, that the bilateral mode is not always appropriate in emergency situations involving the efforts of several capable organizations, public and private.

A related issue is the nature of the role AID should play in the in-country coordination of emergency assistance. If AID actively seeks or assumes the leadership role, AID may place itself in a vulnerable political position if the assistance does not meet host country and donor expectations. Yet if AID leaves the role to others, it could be blamed for not leading the effort. Most important is the attitude of the host government toward coordination of assistance by outsiders. Many host governments are uneasy about such efforts, preferring to deal with each donor separately. Some governments were prepared to handle this task because of their experience with such plans or organizations and because they had the personnel to make the plans effective -- Niger, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia, for example. Unless there is a clear lack of leadership in the international community, AID should not attempt to fill the coordinating role. Higher profiles make better targets, and international organizations should be reminded that their international funding base makes them the natural choices to represent the donor community in dealings with host governments and in coordinating the efforts of the donors.

3. LEGISLATION AND FUNDING

Existing legislation provides the framework for mounting an effective U.S. drought-emergency response. How these existing legislative authorities and the supplemental funds available through special appropriation can and should be used are the topics of this chapter. Action recommendations are presented for (1) developing an action plan based on available authorities, (2) requesting a supplemental appropriation when needed, (3) providing Congress with plans on the use of supplemental funds, and (4) urging allocation of some supplemental funds for operating expenses.

3.1 Action Plan Based on Legislative Authorities

Action Recommendation: AID should develop a plan for addressing a future famine by reviewing the various legislative authorities it can draw upon.

The various legislative authorities provide a variety of options for marshaling resources and developing a plan for the U.S. response to a future famine. The relevant legislation includes the following:

- Titles I, II, and IV of the Agricultural Trade and Development Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (PL 480)
- Section 416 of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended
- The Food Security Wheat Reserve Act of 1980
- Section 101(b) of PL 98-107
- Chapter 9 of Part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, especially Sections 491, 492, and 493
- Chapter 1 of Part I of FAA, especially Sections 101, 103, 104, and 106(d)(3)
- Section 610 of Part III of the FAA

Table 1 highlights the uses and key features of this legislation. Responsibility for determining the use of the various authorities differs. Decisions about food under PL 480 and Section 416 are made by the Food Aid Subcommittee of the development Coordination Committee, which includes AID, USDA, and the Office of Management and Budget. AID chairs the PL-480 Title II working group of the Food Aid Subcommittee. The President directs allocations from the Food Security Wheat Reserve. PL 98-107 is the responsibility of USDA.

Table 1. U.S. Legislation Enabling Famine Relief Efforts in Developing Countries

Legislation	Uses	Key Features/Authorities
PL 480 Title I Title II	Commodity sales Donation of commodities	Concessional commodity sales to development countries. Commodity donations to needy people through U.S. or foreign private voluntary organizations, bilateral programs, or multilateral agencies, including the World Food Program. Also permits inland transportation when there are "extraordinary relief requirements."
Title IV		
Section 403(b)	Discounted commodities	Discounted prices of Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) stocks in inventory.
Agricultural Act of 1949		
Section 416	Donation of commodities	Includes any commodity in stock or purchased by CCC (e.g., dairy grains, oilseeds).
Food Security Wheat Reserve		
Act of 1980	Donated wheat	Up to 300,000 metric tons of 4-million ton reserve may be donated in any fiscal year for use under Title II, PL 480 to provide urgent humanitarian relief. The emergency reserve was first used in late 1984 for African famine relief.
PL 98-107		
Section 101(b)	Commodity sales	Waiver of any price restrictions regarding minimum price at which a commodity may be sold.
Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) Chapter 9, Part I		
Section 491	Relief and rehabilitation to alleviate human suffering from natural and human-caused disasters.	"Notwithstanding any provision of this or any other Act."
Section 492		Up to 50 million in any fiscal

year may be borrowed from
Development Assistance accounts.

Section 493 The President can appoint a
Special Coordinator for
International Disaster Assistance
to coordinate responses to
foreign disasters among U.S.
agencies and between the United
States and other donors.
One responsibility of the Special
Coordinator is to formulate and
coordinate contingency plans to
provide disaster relief.

Chap. 1, Part I Development "Congress reaffirms the
Section 101 for humanitar- traditional humanitarian ideals
ian relief of of the American people and renews
hunger its commitment to assist people
in developing countries to
eliminate hunger...."

Section 103 Development in Furnish assistance to "alleviate
agriculture, starvation, hunger and
rural develop- malnutrition."
ment, and
nutrition.

Section 104 Development in Assistance for health and health
population and disease prevention, and safe
health. water and sanitation.

Section 106(d) Reconstruction, "Programs of reconstruction
(e) early warning following natural or manmade
disasters and programs of
disaster preparedness, including
the prediction of and contingency
planning for natural disasters
abroad."

Part III, Transfer of Up to 10 percent of funds
Section 610 funds between appropriated for any FAA account
accounts may be accounts transferred to
any other account. The account
to which funds are transferred
cannot be increased by more than
20 percent.

Chapter 9 FAA authorities are allocated by the AID
Administrator. It is suggested that these authorities be assigned
to the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in AID for
short-term disasters, as has been the tradition, but that for
extended disasters these authorities be assigned to the relevant
AID regional bureau. The responsibility for implementing the
various titles of Chapter 1 largely rests with AID's regional

bureaus. Finally, the authority to transfer funds between accounts in FAA lies with the AID Administrator.

3.2 Requests for Supplemental Funds

Action Recommendation: When an initial or updated review of resources to be made available shows that AID cannot address famine needs at the level of a U.S. commitment or that resources moved from any category to address the famine should be replenished, AID should promptly request a supplemental appropriation from Congress.

In response to the African famine, the United States agreed generally to provide 50 percent of estimated emergency food needs. Because of the massive extent of the famine, virtually all of the authorities identified in Table 1 were used.

3.2.1 Administration Request

In February 1984, the Executive Branch requested \$90 million in PL 480 Title II supplemental assistance. Congress appropriated \$150 million: \$90 million in March and the remaining \$60 million months later in July, delayed by military aid amendments for Central America. As part of that supplemental legislation, Congress directed that up to \$90 million in commodities under USDA control be offered for sale to famine-stricken African countries from Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) stocks.

In the summer of 1984, AID initiated discussions with the State Department and members of Congress and their staffs on obtaining an additional supplemental appropriation to bridge the period when Congress would be out of session. In September 1984, a bill for supplemental funding of \$50 million failed to pass.

In February 1985, the Executive Branch submitted a request for \$235 million in supplemental appropriations for the remainder of FY 1985: \$185 million of Title II food assistance and \$25 million each for disaster assistance and refugee assistance. Prior to the submission of the Administration request, AID provided separate briefings in mid-January to the staff of the relevant Congressional committees.

Several factors influenced the size and timing of the Administration submission. AID was only one of the agencies providing input to shape the Administration request. Within AID, there was vigorous discussion about the level of supplemental funding needed. The request submitted to Congress in February 1985 represented a compromise. Additionally, domestic budgetary constraints and political considerations, particularly about Ethiopia, needed to be weighed against international humanitarian

demands. Deliberations about the relative merits of these factors took place in an ongoing system with its own calendar and other commitments: the November 1984 Presidential and Congressional elections and the February 4, 1985 presentation of the FY 1986 Administration budget to Congress delayed the AID submission from the fall of 1984 to February 5, 1985. Furthermore, the crowded Congressional calendar made pushing the legislation through more difficult.

3.2.2 The 1985 Supplemental Appropriation

In April 1985, supplemental legislation was passed by Congress that included selected funds made available through the end of FY 1986. (Appendix A contains the text of the authorization and appropriation legislation--PL 99-8 and PL 99-10, respectively.) A Presidential statement valued the total appropriation at over \$1 billion. It included the following elements:

- \$400 million for PL 480 Title II, consisting of \$384 million in new appropriations and \$16 million in carry-over from FY 1984, available through December 1985
- \$135 million for disaster relief and recovery available through March 31, 1986
- \$2.5 million for AID to monitor food and disaster assistance, available through March 1986
- \$25 million to carry out select provisions of the Migration and Refugee Act of 1962, as amended, available through September 1985
- \$12.5 million of emergency migration and refugee assistance for Africa, available through March 1986
- \$225 million in emergency reserve, available for PL 480 Title II food and its transport through September 1986, with certification by the President that such funds were essential for famine relief
- Up to 200,000 metric tons of Section 416 commodities, at least half of which were to be wheat or wheat products

3.2.3 Differences Between the Administration Request and the Congressional Appropriation

There was apparently a substantial difference between the Administration request and the Congressional appropriation, highlighted by Congress because it believed that AID, as the Administration's representative, had significantly underestimated the level of need.

AID's "level of need" was based on food and nonfood estimates. Food needs were described as the discrepancy between basic food consumption required for survival and available food resources. Resources identified in AID's presentation included "informal" (i.e., roots and tubers), hidden production for black market sales, and on-farm cereal stocks. AID postulated that these three sources reduced the estimated food shortfall by just over one-half. Congress questioned the validity of these claims. The food need estimates presented to Congress by AID were substantially below those provided by USDA, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and private voluntary organizations (PVOs).

AID distinguishes emergency food needs from systemic, regular program food needs. The 1985 Administration request for supplemental appropriation focused exclusively on emergency food needs. Neither USDA, FAO, other donors, nor PVOs differentiate between regular and emergency food needs. Instead, they focus on overall food need. USDA assesses the amount of food needed to bridge the difference between a country's domestic food production plus its commercial import capacity and either its status quo food need based on its recently achieved levels of food consumption or a nutrition-based need derived from FAO's minimum dietary intake for each country. FAO estimates crop year net staple food production in cereals and cereal equivalents and compares the results with the previous season and a "normal" year to determine shortfall. PVOs provide assessments derived largely from on-the-ground observations. Thus, methodology differs among AID, USDA, FAO, and PVOs. How food need estimates can be derived in the future is discussed in Section 4 on early warning systems.

Nonfood need estimates were also the subject of considerable differences between Congress and AID. The Administration requested \$25 million in nonfood disaster assistance; Congress appropriated \$135 million. The Administration requested \$25 million in refugee assistance; Congress appropriated \$37.5 million. Although these differences partly reflected the relationship between estimated food need and estimated nonfood need, the Administration request was dismissed by Congress. Instead, various members of each house sought additional information to help determine levels of food and nonfood needs upon which to base legislation and appropriations.

The AID Administrator expressed the need for quick passage of legislation; media coverage -- especially television -- vividly presented the depth of the problem; and testimony by various members of Congress who had visited several of the famine-stricken countries underscored the need to act quickly. These factors led to much informal working among relevant committees in both Houses of Congress in arriving at authorization and appropriation figures. Two months elapsed between submission of the Administration bill and passage of legislation by Congress.

Based on legislative authorities available and expenditures made, three conclusions can be drawn from the comparison of the 1985 Administration request and the 1985 supplemental

appropriation. First, the amount of new resources appropriated and used was substantially less than the \$1 billion value attached to the 1985 supplemental appropriation. Second, the combined use of existing authorities and the Administration Title II request would have resulted in greater Title II emergency expenditures in FY 1985 than were actually made under the 1985 supplemental appropriation in FY 1985. Third, the Administration might have needed to request another supplemental appropriation for FY 1986 had Congress not appropriated funds through December 1985.

The first conclusion is based on the following factors:

- AID can use Section 416 commodities with Development Coordination Committee approval without Congressional authorization. Thus, the Section 416 portion of the legislation valued at about \$200 million provided no additional funding or resources beyond those already available. Furthermore, the supplemental appropriation requirement to use an equal amount of wheat in relation to dairy products restricted its use because Africa's absorptive capacity of wheat was limited.
- The \$225 million reserve for PL 480 Title II food and its transport was not used.
- Of the \$400 million appropriated for Title II, \$16 million was in carryover from FY 1984.

Thus, new resources made available by the 1985 supplemental appropriation equaled \$784 million (\$1 billion minus \$200 million under Section 416 and \$16 million in FY 1984 Title II carryover). Of the remainder, the \$225 million reserve was not used, leaving a balance of \$559 million.

The second conclusion is based on the following analysis:

- The Administration Title II request for the remainder of FY 1985 was \$185 million.
- While Congress was considering supplemental legislation, AID, with USDA approval, ordered commodities with the intention of using Section 403(b) of PL 480 (the Kasten Amendment) to acquire food from CCC stocks at an estimated savings through repricing of \$86.4 million. However, no obligations under Section 403(b) were incurred because none of the commodities ordered had left the port before funds from the 1985 supplemental appropriation were available to cover these commodity costs.
- Combining intended use of Section 403(b) (\$86.4 million) with the Administration request (\$185 million) and the FY 1984 Title II carryover (\$16 million), the total Title II emergency resources that could have been allocated between January and September of 1985 were \$287.4 million.

- Under the 1985 supplemental Title II appropriation, AID actually allocated only \$260.3 from April through September 1985.

The third conclusion stems from the traditional practice of submitting a request for supplemental funds only for the current fiscal year. The 1985 supplemental appropriation passed by Congress was intended to deal with the problem without regard to fiscal year -- the famine did not end when FY 1985 ended. Congress appropriated Title II funds through December 1985; AID obligated the remaining \$139.7 million from the 1985 supplemental appropriation in the period October-December 1985.

The preceding discussion illustrates the complexities of designing and obtaining a supplemental appropriation relative to available authorities. The process will never be simple. But with advance planning and prompt submission of a supplemental request to allow Congressional review to the extent feasible, the process can be facilitated.

3.3 Plans for Supplemental Funds

Action Recommendation: To avoid delays in the use of appropriated supplemental funds AID, as the Administration representative, should submit plans to Congress while legislation is pending that show how supplemental funds will be used.

Although AID staff met several times with Congressional committee staff during deliberation on the 1985 supplemental appropriation, the focus was on needs assessment, not implementation. Before any funds provided in Title III of PL 99-10 could be obligated, the legislation required the AID Administrator to certify to Congress that plans for the use of the funds had been prepared on a country-by-country basis. Twenty separate country plans were prepared over the period April-June 1985. Thus, funds could not be allocated for some countries until as late as July 1985, and food and nonfood assistance provided by such funds could not be distributed to needy recipients in those countries until much later than July.

As stated in the legislation, the Congressional intent of country plans was to ensure effective use of the funds by providing food in a timely and efficient manner to those most in need. The concept of planning for the use of supplemental funds is sound, especially for a major appropriation involving several categories of funds to be used for different purposes. Although the level of funds to be available in each category could not be determined during deliberations on the 1985 supplemental appropriation, a general plan could have been provided to Congress by AID during this time. It could have addressed concern by Congress for the use of the funds and could have avoided delays after passage of the legislation due to reporting requirements.

Furthermore, such a plan could eliminate the requirement for Congressional notification for emergency projects.

3.4 Management of Supplemental Funds

Action Recommendation: In future requests, AID should again encourage Congress to appropriate a portion of supplemental funds for the management of program activities to be supported by those funds.

As part of the 1985 supplemental appropriation, Congress allocated \$2.5 million to AID for operating expenses for monitoring food and disaster assistance in Africa. Regardless of the nature of a program, it is sound practice to apportion some funds for the management of program operations to accomplish program objectives. Program goals were clear -- feed and provide ancillary support to starving Africans. Implementation was complex -- more than a score of famine-affected countries, the use of a host of PVOs to distribute resources, mobile populations in search of food, poor infrastructure, local civil strife, and negative government policies. In the case of the African famine, AID could draw upon its specially allocated operating expenses to facilitate implementation through revised plans and to ensure that resources reached those most in need through the use of such techniques as monitoring food distribution at its final point.

Future U.S. assistance to famine victims should also include special provision for operating expense funds to manage the program. As a guide, operating expenses should be about 1.5 to 2 percent of program funds.

4. EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS

Various aspects of an Africa-wide early warning system are in place or under development by African governments, bilateral donors, and international organizations. How such a system can be better utilized to monitor droughts and incipient famines is the topic of this section. Recommendations are presented in the following areas: defining the role of host governments, integrating U.S. early warning systems efforts, coordinating early warning systems among donors and international organizations, using early warning systems in development, and evaluating early warning systems projects.

4.1 Early Warning System Description

An early warning system uses current agricultural and socioeconomic data to warn of certain oncoming calamities in order to gain foreknowledge of droughts and subsequent crop losses so that timely measures may prevent famine conditions.

Such a system would ideally involve both high technology remote-sensing systems for gathering data on crop stress and drought conditions and on-the-ground observation for gathering traditional agricultural and agroeconomic data and socioeconomic data reflecting human factors. Much of the data can then be processed and analyzed by computers and interpreted using a variety of methodologies.

4.1.1 High-Technology Systems

The advent of satellite photography has given rise to various types of remote-sensing technologies and interpretations of the resulting photo imagery. Table 2 presents a chart comparing various technical options and cost figures. Systems included in the chart are frequently used in combination. For example, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) uses advanced polar-orbiting satellites to assess crop stress and drought conditions in Africa. If readouts indicate potential problems, higher resolution systems can be employed to produce more detailed information on targeted areas. Subsequently, these aerial surveys can be further verified and refined by ground surveys.

The capabilities of older satellite technologies are fairly well known; newer ones (e.g., Metsat) are still under evaluation. The use of specific satellite technologies depends on the particular purpose, the resolution required, ownership of the satellite, and the availability of funds. In recent years, enormous strides have been made in the field of remote sensing for a variety of purposes, including crop forecasting. Experts still encounter difficulties with most imagery in distinguishing among types of vegetation (crops, weeds, shrubbery), irrigated and nonirrigated areas, cloud data, and actual measurements of precipitation. Others cite microclimatic phenomena such as highly localized winds or rains, especially across the Sahelian zone. Finally, those interpreting high-technology satellite imagery have not yet fully solved the problem of translating yield extrapolations per unit of planted land into production estimates in terms of noncrop versus crop lands or one type of crop versus another. This is true especially in areas of the world where subsistence farmers often grow crops on half-acre fields.

4.1.2 On-the-Ground Observations

Satellite imagery, although an increasingly valuable source of complementary information, is but one leg of an early warning system and is not a substitute for the traditional methods of on-the-ground monitoring of vegetation and other land resources. The need for such observation of crop cycles to help develop statistics dealing with food supply and demand will persist, even though many may use such data as a means of verifying information

obtained through remote-sensing technologies.

Table 2. Remote-Sensing Options: Comparative Capabilities and Costs

To see Table 2, please order Document No. PN-AAL-083.

On-the-ground observation is also essential for gathering data on socioeconomic indicators such as migrations, price changes and relationships among prices (e.g., between livestock and cereals), sale of livestock and of personal possessions, and, in particular, nutritional and health surveillance data. For example, under an AID contract, Tulane University sent small teams of specialists to seven drought-stricken countries in 1985 to assemble a variety of social data pertaining to health/nutritional conditions, demography, food reserve habits, migrations, and sale of personal items. On the physical side, another contractor is assembling data ranging from pluviometry (rain measurement), water supply, planting areas, and production to storage facilities, access roads, and transportation assets. The researchers obtain these data from a wide array of secondary sources including host governments, local inhabitants, USAID Missions, NOAA, other U.S. agencies, bilateral and international donors, nongovernmental organizations and private voluntary organizations (PVOs), and travelers. The data are subsequently processed using advanced computer techniques. Once these factors have been compared with baselines reflecting normal conditions (including "normal" hunger periods), the existence and extent of famine threats can be assessed.

Variations from baselines (when baselines exist, which frequently is not the case) can often validate other early warning system data and provide further indications of impending disasters. The populations -- survivors of past calamities -- have honed their faculties of observing the life-threatening phenomena of their hostile environment over the course of generations. In contrast to the subject of crop data, experts differ on the type of socioeconomic and cultural data to be generated and the weight to be assigned to identical factors when applied to different population groupings. Formulas need to be developed that incorporate common denominators that adequately -- if not ideally -- serve the needs of all users.

Development of any comprehensive early warning system should, of course, occur in close cooperation with the local private sector, which generally maintains its own informal information system. Countrywide distributors (e.g., Lever Bros., Holt, Nestle, breweries, trucking firms) closely observe developments that may positively or negatively affect the business cycle. Port activities, import/export movements, wholesale and retail price levels, and employment conditions are some of the other indicators to be considered.

There is agreement that data concerning on-farm and commercial food stores, government reserve stocks, regional food availabilities, import patterns, triangular trade possibilities, and foreign exchange holdings must be included in an early warning system. Otherwise, no meaningful assessment can be made of the "bottom line" -- the magnitude of the remaining gap that must be met by the donor community.

4.2 Host Governments and Early Warning Systems

Action Recommendations:

1. Host countries must become convinced that early warning system efforts are in their own interest.
2. African governments and regional organizations must become fully involved in early warning system design and operation.

Host country data vary in usefulness and accuracy depending on how well staffed and financed governments are and how convinced they are that such data are useful to them. When data do exist, they may often be inadequate or "sanitized."

Donors are working with a variety of early warning systems. Appendix B shows a new U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) questionnaire that should also meet many needs of other donors (including the United States). Its part 1B appears partially to parallel an early warning system line of socio-economic inquiry. The World Food Program (WFP) has also developed a questionnaire that requests much of the same information covered by the FAO form and sought simultaneously by U.S. and other donor agencies -- more often than not from the same host government and private sector sources. The European Economic Community (EEC) office in Brussels produces vast amounts of in-house data, and Licross in Geneva receives reports from its far-flung donor and host country affiliates. FAO has established both formal and informal arrangements with many private voluntary agencies to augment its access to "up-country" data and information on a monthly basis.

Most host countries have gradually come to see the utility of early warning systems. In many instances, their capabilities and efforts require considerable upgrading and, above all, institutionalizing. The objective must be the Africanization of early warning systems or, at least, the creation of a technical counterpart structure to permit ongoing involvement and dialogue. African governments and regional organizations must become the decision-makers based on a national or regional capacity to gather, receive, and assess pertinent data with progressively diminishing assistance of the donor community. This requires early emphasis on the fullest involvement of African governments in early warning systems. The roles that regional organizations

like the Interstate Committee for the Fight Against Drought (CILSS)/Agrhymet and the sensing installations in Nairobi and Ouagadougou can play should be fully utilized. The Sahel countries have been particularly aggressive in this respect, as noted in the conclusions from the meeting held at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris, May 20-21, 1985 and again on October 23-24, 1985 under the aegis of the Club du Sahel and CILSS secretariats.

Systematic, joint donor/host country assessments at various times in the crop cycle should increase the role of African governments as contributors to, and coordinators of, their early warning systems. On-the-ground observation activities can draw on the example set by the Sahel governments and their supporting regional organizations as well as by the Government of Zimbabwe's information collection facility.

Early warning activities must focus on making the output of the systems creditable to all users, donors as well as host countries. Even if overriding domestic policy considerations lead an African government to disavow or disregard early warnings, general agreement on criteria and methodology may at least reduce or avoid opposition to relief actions by the donor community. (Section 10 contains a fuller discussion of institutionalizing early warning systems in host countries in the postemergency period.)

African governments must be convinced that early warning systems directly benefit them and are not simply imposed by donors. The prevention of future famines must become the first national priority of every drought-prone country. The perception, where it exists, that African governments assist donors' early warning system activities must be reversed to one of donors assisting African countries in the perfection of their early warning system capabilities to safeguard their populations against future calamities.

4.3 AID's Famine Early Warning System Project

Action Recommendations:

1. AID should encourage and finance the further development of the Africa Bureau's Famine Early Warning System project.
2. For the present, such development should remain the operating responsibility of the Africa Bureau, with financial and information inputs from other bureaus such as Science and Technology (S&T) and the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). Data base development and coordination should be the responsibility of the Center for Development Information and Evaluation of the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination

(PPC/CDIE).

3. The Africa Bureau should set a high priority on providing necessary technical assistance to African governments to improve their abilities to gather, preserve, analyze, and react to early warning data.

Since at least 1980, the Africa Bureau with OFDA assistance has provided NOAA-generated weather data to USAID Missions in Africa for dissemination to host country governments. The proliferation of high-technology methodologies and their increasing timeliness coincided with (or may have been the result of) the escalation of the 1984-1986 African drought. Additional sources of information were identified, and data from ground observations and feedback from Missions on local indicators of oncoming problems were factored into the developing system. When the Inter-Agency Task Force was established, NOAA was made a member and early warning indicia became important in forecasting likely trouble spots. The growing system also provides data for AID's input into the quarterly USDA food needs assessments. The ultimate goal is to provide projections of populations at risk, with adequate lead time to institute relief measures. The system is based on the theory that famines, in contrast to earthquakes, tidal waves, and volcanic eruptions, are the culmination of a series of time-phased events (i.e., "creeping" disasters). Much remains to be accomplished before the system is fully operational.

Currently, for six countries in Africa, AID's Africa Bureau plays a leading role within the U.S. Government in collating information and data that make up the famine early warning system. The Africa Bureau has organized an early warning advisory group for the Famine Early Warning System project, which coordinates intra-AID activities by OFDA, FVA, S&T, and the Africa Bureau. The creation of a permanent U.S. early warning system coordinating body has been considered, but current budgetary restraints make that unlikely, particularly given that technical responsibilities of the various agencies are now well delineated, making coordination easier in the event of another emergency. For example, a recent National Security Council decision made the Department of Agriculture responsible for final estimates of international food production/availabilities, and AID is a major contributor to that effort.

Because it draws from a variety of sources, it is important that the development and coordination of AID's data base be under the auspices of the agency's central information coordinating office -- CDIE. At present the Famine Early Warning System project extends only to six African target countries, but when expanded it could be extended to selected other areas or worldwide. As that occurs, the AID bureaus involved could help to finance the CDIE operation in order to become contributors to and users of an expanded system. For the present, the further development of the system should remain the basic responsibility of the Africa Bureau, which should have the concomitant responsibility for coordinating it with OFDA, FVA, S&T, and PPC within AID and with

U.S. agencies and international organizations such as NOAA, FAO, Agrhymet, and others.

4.4 Coordination of Early Warning Systems

Action Recommendations:

1. Donors should convoke meetings with host governments to achieve agreement on the definition and composition of an early warning system.
2. Donors should reduce duplication of early warning system functions by agreeing on specific technical and financial contributions.
3. Donors and host countries should agree on annual action plans, including (a) joint multidonor/host country assessments midway in the rainy season to determine likely minimum needs in order to ensure that first relief shipments arrive by January, (b) joint multidonor postharvest missions to refine estimates and determine residual relief requirements, and (c) multidonor logistic missions to assess infrastructure and possible limitations on timely relief distributions.
4. During emergencies, needs assessments should focus first on time frames during which relief can actually reach populations at risk.

Several organizations outside the United States are also involved in high-technology data collection activities, especially in France, such as the EEC and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). These and other bilateral and international donors also draw on their on-the-ground networks for early warning system-related data. These organizations include several branches of FAO, WFP, Licross, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the U.N. Office of Emergency Operations in Africa (UNOEOA), and others (e.g., Canada is considering establishing an early warning system within its foreign aid agency).

No formal division of roles currently exists among donors in the early warning system area. However, there is considerable informal cooperation (for example, NOAA uses WMO data and FAO receives NOAA printouts). At the same time, there is also a good deal of duplication or overlap of efforts. This is true among donors and within donor organizations. Just as AID and USDA may independently report from the field and produce separate sets of data and conclusions (at least initially) in Washington, so do FAO and WFP in Rome. Moreover, there are important differences in methodology. For example, until now FAO's "Global Information and Early Warning System" has reported only on major

cereal crops (wheat, rice, coarse grains), omitting data on traditional African food (e.g., cassava, millet, yams, pulses). AID will sponsor a workshop in Africa this year to provide training in the use of a food deficit assessment methodology developed by AID for use in the field. It will also provide an opportunity for other donor and field organizations to consult on different approaches to carrying out assessments.

It appears neither possible nor desirable for the United States, although the largest and, in the past, the most effective donor, or for any other single donor to shoulder the burden of early warning systems alone. The technical, financial, and logistic potential of all sources should be coordinated to the maximum extent possible.

As a first step, interested members of the donor community, host countries, and relevant African organizations need to agree on a common set of definitions for an early warning system. The components of such a system (data, methodologies, evaluation criteria, division of labor among sponsors, cooperation and coordination modes, and financial contributions) also need to be defined.

A plenary meeting, possibly under the aegis of an international body, could serve as a venue for organizing several technical working groups and round tables that would address topics such as those indicated above. The longer term aim should be the coordination of efforts, including the necessary compromises needed to arrive at a single early warning system.

Exchanges of information in discrete technical fields would supply the foundation and lead progressively to coordination in an increasing number of areas. Eventually, bilateral, multilateral, and host country policymakers would be able to base their discussions and negotiations on a unified set of premises flowing from coordinated findings at the expert level. Consideration also should be given to the advantages of an integrated early warning data base that would consolidate the inputs of the different participants in the system into an internationally acceptable report. Electronic data processing has virtually eliminated the technical bars to such an approach.

The basic thrust of early warning system efforts must be preventive. Timing is critical. The agro-economic and socio-economic indicators accompanying repetitive rainless seasons very likely can be used to project an impending famine before the end of the growing season. Earlier identification of possible food shortages may be possible, but the case of Niger in 1985 shows some of the limitations of such an effort. As of the end of June, rainfall was 80 percent below the 35-year average. However, late and ideally distributed rains in July and August produced a better than average harvest, obviating the need for food relief.

Late August marks the gradual ending of the normal rainy season in the Sahel (the corresponding dates vary for other

regions of the continent). Given this information, a scenario such as the following might be appropriate:

- Multidonor missions and host countries review all available data and information on food supply and demand before the end of the rainy season. Starting from common premises, they jointly develop "best case" and "worst case" projections to provide provisional parameters of gap/assistance requirements. These provisional requirements, in turn, determine immediate action needs and contingency measures that will be triggered as the emergency unfolds. It is vital that the first relief actions be instituted at that point. Only in this way can the minimum relief supplies reflecting "best case" assumptions start to arrive in the Sahel by January for immediate distribution.
- After the end of the rainy season, a multidonor logistics mission assesses the infrastructure of the host countries and -- in the case of landlocked countries -- of relevant port installations, forwarding facilities, and road conditions. This will determine rehabilitation measures required, as well as quantitative limitations on relief distribution.
- The minimum-maximum parameters of the mid-season estimate and "shadow" relief scenarios undergo constant narrowing in the ensuing months as data harden, which may trigger additional shipments.
- By November, postharvest assessments should permit fairly firm assessments of the remaining food gap and the needs for foreign assistance and other survival measures.
- Simultaneously, a followup logistics mission assesses the adequacy of the infrastructure for the distribution of relief where and when it is needed, to establish the maximum quantities that can reach drought victims in a timely fashion.
- The reconciliation of the results of the two multidonor missions would provide quantitatively realistic, time-phased shipment/distribution schedules for food and other relief supplies, both commercial and donated. Generally, all shipments should arrive by April to permit positioning prior to the onset of the rainy season.
- Agreement among and between donor and host country experts on gaps/relief requirements and logistic realities -- food/nonfood/cash -- will furnish policymakers with the premises for timely decisions. This will help ensure that the balance of relief supplies and matching distribution systems are positioned prior to the onset of the rains.

4.5 Development Planning and Early Warning Systems

Action Recommendations:

1. Early warning system data should be fully utilized as an important contribution to development planning.
2. AID should mandate that Country Development Strategy Statements and annual Action Plans for drought-prone countries contain an explicit discussion of early warning systems and their role in host country and USAID development planning.

The original concept of an early warning system was a direct response to the recurrent drought/famine phenomenon. Increasingly, experts see much wider applications for the data that are and can be developed under such a system. Both high-technology imagery and data from on-the-ground observations can become the underpinnings for development planning. Programming in African countries has more often than not suffered from a lack of reliable baseline data resulting from inadequate host country data collection institutions, which are costly to develop and maintain. A data base developed for an early warning system can provide physical indicators of the nature of the land, its climatology, demography, and socioeconomic data in a host of fields. A fully developed famine early warning system can and should help to transform a disaster phase into an ongoing developmental planning process.

AID should mandate the inclusion of a brief section on early warning systems in the Country Development Strategy Statement and annual Action Plan for each drought-prone country. The analysis should consider the need and utility of early warning system-type data in overall development planning by the host country and, specifically, in the context of the USAID program. (See Section 10 for a fuller analysis of this subject.)

4.6 Evaluation Plan for Famine Early Warning System Projects

Action Recommendation: AID and other donors should establish time-phased evaluation plans for their own early warning system projects that focus on (1) the technical effectiveness and cost/benefits of the system, particularly with regard to acceptable "triggering" indicia; (2) improvements in international cooperation and coordination; (3) progress in the "Africanization" of early warning system activities; and (4) utilization of an early warning system as a development planning tool.

AID's Famine Early Warning System project and other donors' early warning system programs involve major outlays. In the face of budget constraints, they may loom progressively larger as foreign assistance availabilities shrink and the media's spotlight on the African emergency dims. Therefore, AID and other donors should give early attention to the development of phased evaluation plans for their own famine early warning system projects. They should closely evaluate the technical feasibility and accuracy of the system, including the high-technology components. They should also assess the utility, effectiveness, and cost/benefits of the system(s) under various hypotheses.

Various assumptions should be made concerning host government willingness to shoulder progressively larger shares of the costs. If the next few years are marked by good rains and ample harvests, there might be a great temptation to apply limited resources to more tangible priorities. Donors, especially AID as the foremost champion of an effective early warning system, must also determine points of diminishing returns when no early warning signals are detected by the systems for prolonged periods (indicating little likelihood of a drought or famine). The possibility of retiring parts of the system or of preparing skeleton project designs that can be quickly fleshed out should be considered.

A parallel line of inquiry should be the evaluation of the extent to which early warning system activities can be justified in terms of their contributions to more effective development planning. If the systems can be considered, totally or partly, cost effective in that context, then the early warning element might be considered either a bonus by-product or a relatively small "insurance premium."

Another element of the evaluation plan should examine progress toward consolidating multidonor efforts and the "Africanization" of country and regional early warning system activities.

Finally, the evaluation should determine the degree to which an early warning system might be designed to provide indicia that would almost automatically send up warning flags to host countries and donors alike. Unlike massive medical crises in which predetermined levels of morbidity and mortality figures signal the onset of a widespread outbreak or an epidemic, famine early warning systems are not that simplistic -- there are myriad variables. But striving for such a result would be a productive endeavor.

5. COORDINATING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The management of a U.S. response to an extended emergency like the famine that spread so extensively over Africa is key to effective implementation. The management structure that should be used for future famines receives primary attention in this section. Attention is also directed to managing assistance to

refugees and coordinating the inputs of other agencies.

5.1 AID's Initial Role

From 1978 to 1982 the Africa Bureau had designated a senior officer as the Coordinator for Refugee and Humanitarian Assistance in the Office of the Assistant Administrator. The last incumbent was transferred in mid-1982 to the Bureau's Technical Resources Office, but retained his involvement in drought-related activities, particularly in Ethiopia and southern Africa. He later became the deputy for planning on the Inter-Agency Task Force.

His efforts led to a heightened awareness of the oncoming disaster and increased involvement by the Bureau as the extent of the crisis became more evident. Country officers increased their consultations with AID's Office of Food for Peace (FFP) and the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA); in the Sahel region, USAID Missions began receiving more frequent updates on rainfall and crop figures from Washington.

From the onset of the crisis in 1983, AID actively assisted affected African nations to mitigate the tragedy, eventually providing up to 80 percent of all assistance in Sudan and 50 percent in most other areas. FFP, in coordination with the USDA and the interagency Development Coordinating Committee, began to increase emergency food shipments in 1983 and quadrupled those amounts in FY 1984. Supplemental appropriations in March and July 1984 provided \$150 million for Title II emergency assistance and \$90 million in Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) stocks for sale or barter. In FY 1984 OFDA provided \$16 million for inland transportation of food to landlocked countries. This amount represented a special supplemental appropriation that was available for 1 month only.

By the summer of 1984, the rains had failed and crops were lost. It was apparent that a more intensive U.S. Government effort was necessary and that it would involve agencies other than AID and the State Department. Deaths from famine increased markedly; the effects of the drought spread across the continent from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa and south along both coasts. Eventually more than a score of countries became affected in varying degrees, particularly Ethiopia, Sudan, Mali, Chad, and Mozambique. The AID Administrator visited Ethiopia in November 1984 to witness the unfolding tragedy firsthand. Stories and films provided by the media and PVOs brought the graphic details to public attention. Congressional committee reports spurred legislators' interest in ensuring that adequate and timely assistance reached those in need.

5.2 The Inter-Agency Task Force

Action Recommendations:

1. In the event of another crisis approaching the magnitude of the 1984-1986 African famine, the President should again publicly announce that the AID Administrator will serve as his Special Coordinator.
2. In a future crisis, an interagency task force should be established in AID under the leadership of the geographic bureau concerned to coordinate the Government's response.
3. Timing depends on a confluence of factors indicating the necessity for wider U.S. Government participation.
4. The team responsible for the course on disaster operations given to OFDA staff, or for a related predecessor course, should aid in the creation of the action group that will handle the next longer term emergency and help to formulate its operating procedures.

In the fall of 1984, President Reagan announced that AID Administrator McPherson would serve as his Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance. This action followed the pattern set by the appointment of the AID Deputy Administrator to the same position in the 1973-1974 Sahel drought. In this role, the Administrator could coordinate the use of resources and personnel of other agencies and departments. The public announcement by the President gave the Administrator heightened visibility with international and bilateral donors.

In his role as Special Coordinator, the Administrator called for the establishment of the Inter-Agency Task Force on the African Emergency. Its charter set forth the objectives of coordinating and expediting the work of all Federal departments and agencies in identifying or locating the people at risk, determining an appropriate U.S. Government response to that risk, and ensuring that U.S. Government-provided relief goods were delivered in a timely and responsive manner.

A three-tiered structure was created to address the African famine and shape the U.S. response. One level was intended to ensure information sharing, another to manage the U.S. response, and the third to provide technical expertise.

5.2.1 Structure

The Inter-Agency Task Force consisted at one level of a group of senior officials representing 13 U.S. Government departments and agencies and a representative of the private voluntary organization (PVO) community. These included AID; the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Health and Human

Services, State, Transportation, and Treasury; the Office of the Vice-President; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the National Security Council; the Office of Management and Budget; the Peace Corps; and the president of Interaction, a coordinating body of PVOs. Initially meeting weekly, the group settled into a biweekly schedule. The meetings served primarily as a forum for information sharing, enabling members to keep their departments and agencies informed. Participants were free to raise operational and policy questions.

At the next level was the State Department/AID Task Force. Often called the "core group," it was action-oriented, closely following the progress of assistance efforts and taking appropriate actions. It met twice a week and oversaw the operations of the staff group.

The staff group, as the third level, consisted of persons assigned by AID and those detailed from other agencies such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Maritime Administration, and the Departments of Transportation and State. This group provided valuable expertise that AID lacked, particularly in logistics and transportation. Members of this group were sent abroad to survey transportation assets and health conditions and to report on special situations.

5.2.2 Leadership

The Director of OFDA was appointed chairman of the Inter-Agency Task Force. To facilitate his task, the Administrator also named him Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa.

The chairman originally had two deputies, one from OFDA and one from the Africa Bureau. In December 1984 a veteran AID officer with previous experience in the Sahel drought, the Sahel Regional Office, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations was named principal deputy. He headed the core and staff group activities. He retired in May 1985 and was replaced by another experienced AID officer who had served in Ethiopia and worked on teams that responded to the Sahel drought and various emergencies in Asia. The Chairman of the Inter-Agency Task Force left AID in October 1985 to direct the Federal Emergency Management Agency and was replaced by the AID Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Africa Bureau.

5.2.3 Functions

From its inception, the Inter-Agency Task Force oversaw the dispensing of over \$2 billion in U.S. Government emergency assistance. It gave other U.S. Government agencies an opportunity to participate in alleviating one of the worst drought crises to date. The core staff of the State Department/AID Task Force provided a focal point for discussion with other bilateral and

international donors. It successfully coordinated the efforts of the Africa Bureau, FFP, and OFDA; it provided a structure in which necessary action could be determined and carried out; and it provided information for the Congress and the public and for testimony by AID administration officials, including the Administrator.

In April 1985, to draw on the extensive capabilities in the functional bureaus, the original chairman suggested to the Administrator that plans be made to disassemble the task force apparatus, move action responsibilities back to the operating bureaus in AID, but retain a coordinating mechanism in the Africa Bureau. A plan was approved in the fall of 1985. The Drought Coordination Staff (DCS) was established in the Africa Bureau, and the State Department/AID Task Force met weekly to assess the latest situations. The DCS and the State Department/AID Task Force ended activities in May 1986. Responsibility for future coordination remains in the Africa Bureau. A special assistant to oversee these activities has again been assigned to the Bureau.

5.3 The Canadian and United Nations Models

Using a task force to handle a crisis is a common practice in the U.S. Government. The task force provides a method by which maximum expert personnel resources can be brought to bear on a given problem without interruption. Task forces were used in the 1973-1974 Sahel drought crisis and the 1979-1982 refugee emergency. The State Department uses them so regularly that it has an operating manual governing their functions.

In this crisis, the Government of Canada and the United Nations established separate organizations to expedite their responses. A comparison provides examples of alternate operational modes.

5.3.1 The Canadian Model

Canada's regular assistance operations are carried on by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). In November 1984, spurred particularly by the CBC film of famine conditions in Ethiopia, the Government designated an Emergency Coordinator to assess food needs in Africa, to work with the voluntary sector to channel Canadian efforts, and to propose steps for the Government to take.

The Coordinator had been a member of Parliament and a former Government minister. He was an expert in communications and the media. He was given a small immediate staff of four experienced civil servants and a group of 20 experts detailed from CIDA. He relied heavily on CIDA support and the Departments of External Affairs, National Defense, Agriculture, and Finance. He coordinated food shipments, cooperated with other donors, and,

in particular, worked with Canadian nongovernmental organizations in mobilizing and channeling the Canadian people's support to feed the hungry.

A unique feature of the Canadian experience was the Government's willingness to match the contributions of individual Canadians to nongovernmental organizations on a dollar-for-dollar basis. (Because of economic stringencies, the Government did not ask Parliament for additional funds -- it sought only the authority to use funds appropriated to the Department of External Affairs for other purposes.) To manage the funds raised by the nongovernmental organizations and matched by the Government, a coalition of nongovernmental organizations, "African Emergency Aid," was formed. A senior representative of CIDA and the Coordinator were members of the Board of Directors. The group reviewed proposals for using those funds submitted by nongovernmental organizations. It was in effect a peer review group with minority Government participation.

The Coordinator also made scores of public appearances across Canada to explain his function and to inform the Canadian public about how their money was being spent in Africa. Town meetings (Africa Forum) were held throughout the country to teach fund-raising techniques to local organizations. The Coordinator's office was scheduled to be phased out in the spring of 1986.

5.3.2 The United Nations Model

By the fall of 1984, several U.N. agencies were actively engaged in responding to the famine crisis in Africa. The FAO and WFP had been escalating food shipments; UNICEF was concerned with the plight of malnourished children and the U.N. Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) with emergency preparations; the World Health Organization, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) were involved with other facets of the emergency. Some agencies were also engaged in separate fund-raising efforts, both from donor governments and from the public. The need for coordinating all these efforts under one agency was recognized by the Secretary-General. In December 1984 he issued a mandate for the establishment of the U.N. Office of Emergency Operations in Africa (UNOEOA), and arrangements were formalized in May 1985. He named the Director of UNDP as director of UNOEOA and gave him the authority to coordinate the work of the other involved U.N. agencies.

As in the case of the Canadian operation, the UNOEOA staff was small, made up of staff detailed from relevant U.N. agencies. UNDP representatives in the field were responsible to UNOEOA. In Sudan and Ethiopia, Assistant Secretaries-General were appointed to coordinate all U.N. activities because of the seriousness of the situation in both countries. UNOEOA was originally scheduled to dissolve on March 31, 1986, but its mandate was extended to October 31, 1986. (A more detailed discussion of

UNOEOA's role and impact is provided in Section 6.)

5.4 Need for a Task Force

The necessity for establishing a task force in any crisis depends on internal and external considerations. Internally, there may be a perceived need for assembling the requisite technical skills to focus on a given problem in a context that requires appropriate coordination of semi-independent offices and departments. External factors also play an important part: the creation of a task force sends signals of high-level concern to the public, the legislature, and the media, and, in the event of an international crisis, to other governments. It is apparent that in the U.S., Canadian, and U.N. examples, the need for coordination was the key factor, with other considerations such as information sharing and media and public attention also playing an important part.

Analysis of the AID experience demonstrates that the Inter-Agency Task Force, especially through its subgroups, fulfilled a variety of functions: it focused the expertise in AID and other agencies on the major problems impeding food distribution; it raised the level of coordination among AID offices as well as among other agencies; it cut through regulations where necessary; it tracked day-to-day operations, highlighted problems, and suggested solutions; and it coordinated information gathering and provided a single source of information for the press and public. The facts are convincing that a task force was called for in a crisis of the magnitude and complexity that faced AID in 1984 through 1986. However, was it the right mode in the right organizational location at the right time?

5.4.1 The Mode

The three-tiered structure seemed awkward to many participants. Those on the Inter-Agency level felt the lack of participation in day-to-day decision-making; those at both the Inter-Agency and core-group levels were unsure of the exact nature and functions of the various levels (despite the words of the charter for the Inter-Agency Task Force). There were unclear channels of decision-making, particularly for policy. A simpler organization would have been as effective and would have given the participants a clearer view of their functions and the action points. The intent of a task force is to reduce bureaucratic layering, not increase it.

In the next crisis, the creation of an action-oriented group should be considered, with necessary policy advice emanating from an advisory council consisting of the relevant AID Assistant Administrators (Africa Bureau and the Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance Bureau) and Office Directors (OFDA) and the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of the African Affairs Bureau of

the State Department. That policy group would advise the Administrator or whoever is designated as the President's Special Representative.

This would provide a lean organization focusing on action responsibilities with a direct line to the policymaking group. The action group would consist of those AID office and bureau representatives necessary to the task plus representatives from other relevant departments and agencies. Information sharing could be accomplished by keeping minutes, the model being those kept by the Sahel Working Group in this past crisis. If geographical considerations require it, separate working groups like the Sahel Working Group could be established.

Those responsible for the disaster operations course now provided to OFDA staff, or for its predecessor course, should help establish the organization and its procedures for spearheading the U.S. response to a future "creeping" disaster. Presently, the disaster operations course is provided by USDA. That course should be expanded to deal with the longer term crisis of famine and should be given to other AID personnel, especially those assigned to drought-prone countries. The expanded course could be developed by USDA, OFDA, or a contractor. One member of the team responsible for the original disaster operations course, or for the proposed expanded course, should be available on a continuing basis to help organize policy memos for the group coordinating the U.S. response, establish communications flow, and generally facilitate the U.S. response.

5.4.2 Organizational Location

There was some blurring of responsibilities because the Inter-Agency Task Force was not located within the geographic bureau with primary responsibility for assistance to Africa. Indeed, it was not located in any bureau. While the Africa Bureau was deeply involved in all facets of the crisis, its activities were in effect being coordinated by a task force headed by the director of another AID office (OFDA). What were the alternatives?

The appropriate regional bureau should coordinate inputs that may be provided by AID's Food for Peace Office (FFP), the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and the State Department's Refugee Programs Bureau. Each of these offices specializes in areas that are important for fashioning an effective U.S. response to famine. FFP is responsible for implementing all PL 480 activities focusing on food; the Refugee Programs Bureau is responsible for assisting refugees. OFDA was set up to respond quickly to short-term disasters such as floods or earthquakes, which typically require relief operations of 60-90 days. The appropriate regional bureau should ask OFDA to provide necessary relief assistance quickly to famine-stricken countries. Such assistance is expected to be concentrated in nonfood areas such as provision of blankets, immediate health care, and potable

water.

The appropriate regional bureau is recommended as the lead group to respond to future famines. It is experienced in working in various countries in its region; it maintains line authorities with USAID staff in the host countries; it is well versed in programming funds to address priority needs; it can use its project officers in the field to track program implementation and assess impact; it manages a substantial annual budget allocation; and it uses financial management procedures generally practiced by most units in AID.

The major drawback to selecting a regional bureau is that its personnel are used to operating in accordance with the procedures specified in AID Handbooks (which numbered 37 as of mid-1986). With procurement requirements lifted to permit quick response because of the famine emergency, staff in the bureau must change their style of operation. Suggestions to address this issue are presented later in this section.

The alternatives for lead group are OFDA or FFP. OFDA is not staffed to lead the U.S. response to a future long-term famine, but it is best suited to operate as it usually does to provide relief assistance rapidly wherever it is needed in the world. OFDA is the mirror image of a regional bureau in terms of advantages and disadvantages for leading a U.S. response. OFDA's major asset is that it is not encumbered by the need to follow AID Handbook procedures, and, most important, OFDA need not follow procurement regulations used elsewhere in the Agency. Thus, the office can and has responded quickly with needed relief assistance. OFDA's major disadvantages for serving as lead office result from the nature of OFDA's activities: it responds on a short-term basis to disasters anywhere in the world and its programming of funds has focused on meeting immediate relief needs. Thus it has limited familiarity with any one region or country, and it is not experienced in programming large amounts of money. In addition, OFDA does not typically monitor the short-term activities it supports in the field.

Like OFDA, FFP is a major AID action office that has ongoing worldwide responsibilities in a specialized area. FFP is currently organized functionally according to PL 480 legislation (Titles I and II). Both the Title I and Title II Divisions include all geographical regions to which AID provides assistance. (A realignment of the office by geographic region across the various Titles of PL 480 is currently under consideration.) Ongoing FFP responsibilities already stretch its current staff to the limit. Furthermore, FFP staff is not versed in the program and project documentation required for relief and recovery undertakings. To have given FFP the responsibility for the Task Force would have resulted in an unmanageable burden (what if another similar crisis had arisen in Asia at the same time?).

In contrast, the Africa Bureau has only one area of responsibility: Africa. To carry out that responsibility it has a broad-based organization in Washington and over 30 field offices

in Africa. Its staff is experienced in managing hundreds of millions of dollars in development and economic support assistance; in cooperation with FFP it has an important role in determining levels and use of food assistance; and it has worked with OFDA and the Department of Defense in emergency situations in the past and has daily working relationships with the State Department. Most important, it can move smoothly from relief and recovery tasks directly into development activities. In the next such crisis, the task force should be located in the geographic bureau concerned and should be led by a senior officer from that bureau.

5.4.3 Timing

Was October 1984 the appropriate time for the establishment of the Inter-Agency Task Force? With hindsight it may be argued that the earlier the better. But that ignores the bureaucratic disruption attendant on a full-scale effort of this kind and the fact that AID was already deeply involved in the crisis. This was not a new emergency that suddenly demanded full-scale attention by a host of offices and agencies; it was in every sense a creeping disaster that had been increasingly manifesting its seriousness and extent.

AID was the first of the three donors noted (AID, Canada, the United Nations) to establish a separate group. It acted on its own assessment of the information available about the growing famine, particularly in Ethiopia. It may well have set the example for Canada and the United Nations. In determining the appropriate time for establishing a task force, donors should watch for a confluence of factors such as the following (these factors should not be confused with early warning signals of a famine -- the decision to establish the task force decision comes after early warnings have already resulted in increased donor activity):

- Unforeseen expansion of the drought and famine area
- Sharply increased need for emergency food shipments
- Reports of sudden and large increases in mortality figures
- Major logistic and transportation obstacles to food shipments
- Greater than normal influence of political situations on the movement of food assistance
- Civil unrest leading to wider scale population disruptions

The appointment of a special assistant for drought matters in the Africa Bureau augurs well in this respect. That office could be responsible for tracking the above factors to recommend whether a task force should be assembled.

5.5 Refugee Relief Operations

Action Recommendation: Because of the different philosophies of AID and the State Department Bureau for Refugee Programs on how assistance should be channeled to recipients, steps should be taken before the next emergency to work out a mutually satisfactory approach for situations involving feeding of refugees and nonrefugees in the same groupings. Clarifying guidelines should be issued, if needed, for determining appropriate rations for refugees in those situations.

The presence of a refugee population in the midst of a famine-stricken area creates special problems. It did in the 1984-1986 crisis.

Assistance to international refugees is the responsibility primarily of the Department of State, which has an Office of the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, headed by an Ambassador at Large, and a Bureau for Refugee Programs, the operational group. The Department's statutory mandate results in a large portion of its yearly appropriations going directly to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and other relevant organizations. Over 98 percent of the Bureau for Refugee Programs funds for African refugee assistance went to UNHCR and ICRC in FY 1984, and 90 percent in FY 1985 and for the first 6 months of FY 1986.

This mode of operating through international organizations is in direct contrast to AID's emphasis on bilateral assistance. The State Department has officers in the field who work closely with USAID Missions on issues of refugee special assistance needs (e.g., special foods, medical assistance, wells). AID and State Department operations overlap, particularly when refugees become drought victims. In the 1984-1986 drought, this occurred frequently. For example, a coordination issue arose in western Sudan where there was a mixture of Chadian refugees and Sudanese drought victims. The State Department urged that UNOEOA take responsibility for caring for the entire group, but the USAID Mission insisted on a bilateral approach (it was supplying the vast majority of the assistance going to Sudan). In the end, the USAID view prevailed. In eastern Sudan there was more cooperation among the U.N. agencies, the State Department, and AID. The State Department and AID also cooperated in food distribution programs designed to prevent people from crossing borders and becoming refugees or exacerbating local political situations.

Two situations needing future policy clarification arose. Reports on relief camps indicated that refugees may have received larger rations than before, thereby providing a disincentive to early repatriation. There were also reports alleging USAID insensitivity toward refugees -- an unwillingness to provide food relief on a short-term loan basis, to permit exchanges of food

for seed, or to provide more acceptable local varieties of food. Ambassadors, as heads of country teams, should be able to settle such matters in the field. If further guidance is required, the State Department Bureau for Refugee Programs and the AID Africa Bureau should issue clarifying guidelines.

5.6 The Roles of Other U.S. Government Agencies

Action Recommendation: In a similar emergency, the assets of other U.S. departments and bureaus should again be fully utilized by AID, but with a better sense of mission.

5.6.1 Department of Defense

The resources of the Department of Defense (DoD) were particularly valuable to the Task Force in solving logistics and transportation problems. The logistics unit was headed by a lieutenant-colonel detailed from the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the request of the Inter-Agency Task Force Chairman. The unit included Maritime Administration and Department of Transportation members as well. One problem that surfaced early in the process was the cost of air assets. DoD had previously charged AID the full cost of such flights, including depreciation, crew salaries, and the like, so it was cheaper in some instances to contract for private assistance (the use of helicopters in Sudan was an example). The 1985 supplemental legislation relieved that situation by requiring that DoD charge only the marginal costs. This should make it more attractive to AID to use DoD assets in the next emergency.

5.6.2 Department of Transportation and the Maritime Administration

As part of their work on the logistics unit, representatives from the Department of Transportation and the Maritime Administration traveled extensively in Africa to survey ports and other transportation bottlenecks. Their findings proved valuable to the Task Force and provided the basis for a report to the AID Administrator, as noted in Section 6.1, recommending several cost-cutting measures.

5.6.3 Department of Health and Human Services

Both the U.S. Public Health Service and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) had worked with AID in previous development and emergency programs. Both agencies had their established contacts in AID and worked largely through them. The Public

Health Service provided nurses, sanitation experts, and epidemiologists on relatively short notice for Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Burkina Faso. The majority of the assignments were for 90 days. The Public Health Service reported some confusion over the details of assignments resulting from the lack of guidelines to the field; in one case problems arose over contract interpretation. One-half of the people worked with PVOs and one-half with USAID Missions. There were apparently fewer problems working with PVOs than with the Missions.

CDC supplied experts for Chad and Sudan, but depended largely on its established contacts. CDC complained of a lack of coordinating efforts in Sudan and difficulty on the part of the Inter-Agency Task Force in defining CDC's role. Once in the field, CDC staff worked better with State Department Bureau for Refugee Programs staff than with USAID Missions.

5.6.4 Conclusions

Clearly, other agencies have much to offer AID in a similar crisis, and AID should not hesitate to call on them. At the same time, every effort must be made to inform teams of their specific tasks in the field and to instruct USAID Missions to integrate the work of other U.S. Government organizations into the ongoing relief efforts.

USAID Missions frequently tend to view such teams as possessing not only the professional expertise required, but also the ability to operate independently of Mission guidance. This is not often true; the teams need guidance on specific goals and tasks to be accomplished if their expertise is to be used to advantage. Without this guidance, talent and time are likely to be wasted.

6. IMPLEMENTATION

This section addresses three factors that affected the implementation of the U.S. response. Inadequate logistics arrangements and poor transportation networks in African countries sagged and sometimes broke down under the strain of massive relief supplies, turbulent weather conditions, and restrictive host government policies. Increased U.S. assistance efforts created personnel shortages in Washington and in the field. Finally, the operations of AID's Food for Peace Office (FFP), which was responsible for the lion's share of U.S. food assistance, reflected a need for selected improvements.

6.1 Logistics and Transportation

Action Recommendations:

1. AID should evaluate the World Food Program (WFP) system designed to assist drought-prone countries in developing inventories of their transportation facilities and assets, including periodic updates on quantity and condition, and should be prepared to give financial assistance to the effort.
2. Multidonor missions should try to identify vital transportation links such as roads and bridges whose condition caused bottlenecks during this past crisis. Donors should then set priorities with recipient countries for improving and up-grading links that are particularly prone to repeated failure, taking into consideration maintenance costs and the amount of "normal" traffic these links carry.
3. After FFP and USDA review with the Maritime Administration the six recommendations in the latter's March 1986 report on potential agricultural transportation cost reductions and other options, FFP should take steps to institute those found to be feasible.
4. The State Department and AID should examine agreements they have with West African littoral countries to identify those that would permit negotiation of provisions for expedited duty-free passage of humanitarian assistance from ports to landlocked countries, then negotiate such provisions.
5. Simultaneously, the United States should consider asking the Organization of African Unity or the Economic Commission of West African States to convene a committee for the purpose of drafting regional compacts providing for expedited duty-free shipment of humanitarian assistance from whatever source between and among countries.

In a November 1984 article for the Washington Post, the AID Administrator detailed his observations from his trip to assess conditions in Ethiopia at the behest of President Reagan. His major concern was the lack of adequate transportation for distributing the more than 1 million tons of food he foresaw as necessary over the next 12 months and, more specifically, the need for increased Ethiopian Government allocations of trucks to food distribution. He accurately forecast the spread of the drought to other countries and the consequent strain on their transportation systems.

As the drought progressed, the unreliability of the logistics systems in the affected countries was repeatedly revealed.

In Sudan, the narrow-gauge, light-weight rail system could not cope with massive food shipments; as a result, the United States purchased eight locomotives to strengthen the system and engaged a private truck contractor to provide a backup system. But in the midst of drought, flash floods washed out railroads and roads in the western areas of Sudan, which bore the brunt of the drought, and it became necessary to contract for expensive helicopter flights to ensure food drops in isolated areas. The U.S. Department of Defense supplied Bailey bridges to get across flooded wadis, and supplied rubber boats and rafts in areas where ferries were undergoing time-consuming repairs. Meanwhile, in other areas of the country, lakes and rivers dried up.

Aside from physical problems, there were economic barriers. Truck drivers in some countries went on strike for higher pay; in other countries, host governments kept trucking rates artificially low, resulting in a scarcity of trucks for transporting food and relief supplies. The United States intervened to encourage higher rates in some instances and to resist exorbitant rates in others. Donors complained that governments diverted needed transportation to nonfamine needs. Coastal countries slowed shipments across their borders to their landlocked neighbors. A high-level diplomatic intervention was required to persuade the Government of Nigeria to open more ports to food shipments. Ethiopia initially levied excessively high dollar port charges to earn foreign exchange. Its rates were eventually lowered as a result of donor negotiation. Even when food could be transported to countries in need, storage was insufficient for pre-positioning food to meet anticipated local shortages. Such logistics problems plagued the donor community continuously throughout the emergency.

These physical and economic problems were exacerbated by host governments' inability or unwillingness to correct them. In many instances, concern with other pressing crises such as foreign debt, fears of civil unrest, or even cross-border invasions led host governments to view their perennial transportation problems as unimportant or something that donors would eventually correct.

Because of the shift in AID's development priorities over the years, it no longer engages in large infrastructure projects such as major road building, airport improvements, or port development, and so has few experts in those and associated fields. Thus the Chairman of the Inter-Agency Task Force asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to detail a military logistics expert to oversee a logistics working group comprised of Department of Transportation (DOT) and Maritime Administration staff. As a result of the experience in the 1984-1986 drought, AID's Food for Peace Office plans to establish a logistics office with the assistance of the DOT transportation economist who served on the Task Force.

However, AID cannot be expected to get deeply re-involved in infrastructure projects, although it is taking some emergency steps with the World Bank and the United Kingdom to repair vital road links in western Sudan. But if the experiences of this and

previous droughts in Africa are to be heeded in time to ameliorate logistics problems and their attendant costs in the next crisis, some steps must be taken now.

In early 1985, the Task Force sent two transportation experts from the Department of Transportation and the Maritime Administration to Africa to assess the conditions of the ports and inland transportation systems in the affected countries. They found that ports in general did not present major problems, although some required new and improved unloading facilities. The real problem was clearing ports in a timely way, moving the cargo inland, and distributing it to those in need.

They also discovered that there had been little prior knowledge in the donor community about the details of transportation assets in specific countries. To correct this, the experts recommended that donors assist drought-prone countries to develop inventory systems that would reflect the number and condition of trucks, railroad stock, and ferries in both the private and public sectors. They also suggested that data should be updated on the internal storage and transportation network, including warehouses, roads, bridges, tracks, and areas particularly subject to washouts or sandstorms. This information could serve three purposes: (1) as an input to an early warning system, it would provide vital information on what areas should and could receive pre-positioned food stocks; (2) in times of crisis it would serve as a guide to the additions required in a country's existing transportation fleets and to any immediate repairs required to roads and bridges; and (3) over the longer term, donors could use this information in undertaking development projects with recipient countries to improve transportation systems and upgrade vital road links. A current World Food Program effort to establish such an inventory should be evaluated by AID to determine its cost-effectiveness and the appropriate level of AID financing. Donors could make technical assistance available through contracts with experienced private sector transportation firms or industry associations.

There are other areas of logistics in which efficiencies may improve responsiveness and lower costs. The Maritime Administration, based on its Task Force experience, sent a report to AID and USDA in March 1986 titled "Concepts for Agricultural Cost Reductions." It suggests six different approaches for reducing the cost of relief cargoes. Briefly stated, they involve systematic private voluntary organization (PVO) shipment coordination, utilization of service shipping contracts, public opening of freight bids, chartering for consecutive voyages, development of a transportation network analysis, and pipe transfer of grain using air-flow technology. FFP is also examining the report and plans a meeting with USDA and the Maritime Administration in the near future. Their conclusions should be shared with other donors in an appropriate forum. New options and modifications of those presented in the Maritime Administration's concept paper should be incorporated into an updated description of options.

Finally, there are the myriad problems of coordinating shipments across international boundaries from littoral countries to landlocked areas in West Africa. In calendar year 1985, the Regional Economic Development Services Office (REDSO)/West Africa in Abidjan was responsible for transshipping 240,000 metric tons of food from seven ports to 17 inland destinations in five countries, a tremendous achievement. But the effort required numerous interventions by the United States and other donors with various host governments in the area to relax or waive import controls and customs and cargo inspections and to assign high priorities to assistance cargoes. Perhaps if formal agreements had existed between the United States and other donors and the littoral countries and among the West African countries themselves, delays and extra costs would have been lessened. Opportunities should be explored for including such provisions in existing agreements between the United States and the littoral countries. The experience of the Organization of African Unity and the Economic Commission of West African States could be called on to encourage the completion of transportation compacts among affected African countries for providing duty-free passage of humanitarian assistance at minimal transportation rates.

6.2 Shortage of Experienced Personnel

Action Recommendations:

1. The AID Personnel Office should program its computerized personnel system to quickly identify on-board personnel with pertinent emergency experience.
2. The AID Office of Procurement should provide managers with a summary of methods for quickly mobilizing assistance from personnel in the private sector and in other agencies in times of emergencies.
3. Courses at the Foreign Service Institute and the Senior Seminar should include material on managing natural and human-caused disasters.

Because of a shortage of experienced personnel in key positions during the famine crisis, people unfamiliar with the system had to try to obligate funds in a timely manner to keep nonfood assistance moving.

The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), whose normal annual budget was \$25 million, was suddenly thrust into managing \$135 million in emergency assistance. This required extra personnel, who were eventually obtained. Because OFDA was created to respond quickly to emergencies, the office followed procurement procedures that were very streamlined compared with those followed elsewhere in AID. Although standard in other parts of AID, the Congressional notifications required

by the 1985 supplemental legislation for the expenditure of the \$135 million earmarked for relief and recovery were new to OFDA. Thus, Congressional notifications were sent forward prematurely without prior approval of the project managers, leading to delays and extra work. The number of contract actions alone justified the assignment of a separate contracts officer on a temporary basis.

The lack of project expertise was even more evident in the recovery period. Project proposals were reviewed by personnel from the Office of Project Development of the Africa Bureau and from OFDA. Although the lack of clear guidelines for such reviews hindered the operation, the funds for these proposals were all obligated by the expiration of the obligating period.

The Work of FFP in Washington was not impeded by personnel shortages. Overseas, there was a perceived need for more trained FFP officers, although some Missions preferred to use on-board staff rather than give up their regular development personnel ceilings. FFP officers overseas, particularly in Abidjan, did an extraordinary job in moving food assistance through ports and into recipient countries.

The ease with which AID was able to assign staff for famine-relief efforts in the affected African countries varied. Ethiopia, which had no AID presence at the time of the drought, limited permanent U.S. drought assistance staff to five people. Accordingly, AID recruited and dispatched five direct-hire Americans to Ethiopia. This in-country team received assistance from others on temporary duty assignments. According to the director of the in-country staff, their contributions were invaluable. Perhaps due to the unique challenge in that situation, little difficulty was reported in recruiting either the core staff or those on temporary duty assignments. But assignments to other countries were not that easily made. The impact of the Administrator's extensive personal involvement in famine effort was not perceived at all levels nor acted on as rapidly as situations demanded. Given the decreasing size of AID's work force and the reluctance of any bureaucracy to have its normal work interrupted by temporary crises, AID should examine alternate modes of assigning temporary staff for coping with emergencies. Pulling in people from the "unassigned complement" produced uneven performance.

In order to assign experienced AID personnel quickly when necessary, the Personnel Office should program its computerized personnel system to enable the office to identify on-board personnel with related drought, relief, recovery, or refugee experience. Thought should be given to identifying retired personnel with those qualifications. As a minimum, the list of those receiving awards for their contribution to the 1984-1986 African famine relief and recovery should be maintained and drawn upon when a future need arises.

More effort should be made to involve the private sector in relief efforts. The private sector has many qualified people

willing to be assigned to such work, particularly on a temporary basis. Regular indefinite quantity contracts maintained by AID provide the fastest method for recruiting needed personnel for up to 120 days. The contracts could be amended to provide for longer periods in times of emergencies. For longer assignments, Missions may use personal services contracts without the necessity for full competition or advertising in the Commerce Business Daily. (Section 6.302-2 of the Federal Acquisition Regulations permits contracting without formal advertising in "unusual and compelling urgency.") Finally, there is the authority in Chapter 9 of the Foreign Assistance Act to provide disaster assistance "notwithstanding any other provision of law," which includes procurement laws and regulations.

The experience of this crisis also has demonstrated the value and extent of the expertise that abounds in the U.S. Government. AID has throughout its history called on such expertise for a variety of development tasks through Participating Agency Service Agreements and similar interagency arrangements. The U.S. Government Organization Manual provides a ready guide to such assets.

Ambassadors and country teams in the affected countries found themselves involved in many aspects of this crisis, and many had had no previous experience in such crises. Existing courses in crisis management at the Foreign Service Institute or the Senior Seminar could include segments on natural disaster management.

6.3 Food for Peace

Action Recommendations:

1. Based on recent General Accounting Office (GAO) reports, AID's Office of Food for Peace (FFP) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) should take steps to effect the recommendations concerning acceleration of the approval, procurement, and shipping of emergency food.
2. FFP should develop plans now for closer monitoring of emergency food shipments to recipients.

The Food for Peace program has been an important element in U.S. agricultural and foreign policy since 1954. The original authorizing legislation, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (PL 480), states numerous goals: to expand international trade between the United States and friendly nations, to facilitate currency convertibility, to dispose of surplus U.S. agricultural commodities, to promote the economic stability of U.S. agriculture, to encourage economic development in developing nations, and to promote the foreign policy of the United States. The emphasis among these goals has changed over time to reflect the changing needs of domestic farm policy and

changing foreign policy developments.

Program operations began in 1955. Since that time, AID's FFP and its predecessor offices have been deeply involved in all aspects of the program, including food shipments through WFP, PVOs, and government-to-government. Title II of the Act authorizes donations of food principally for humanitarian purposes. Such donations are used to mitigate the immediate effects of famine as well as to alleviate the causes of the need for food assistance through programs for malnourished children and for adults under food-for-work projects.

In the 1984-1986 crisis, FFP authorized almost \$2 billion in food assistance for Africa. According to the Director of the Title II office, FFP has traditionally relied on requests from PVOs to time its response to famine situations. The onset of famine and the need for sharply increased food aid had been viewed as a "critical mass" that occurs suddenly and without previous warning. But this approach relies on the efficacy and timeliness of PVO or host country requests and does not take into consideration discrete areas or peoples in particular need. It is a reactive rather than an anticipatory mode that restricts long-range planning. According to its Director, FFP has altered its operational mode in light of its experience in the 1984-1986 crisis and the development of new famine early warning systems to include better needs assessments and on-the-ground verifications by FFP officials and others.

Two recent GAO reports (March 1986 and April 1986) contain observations and recommendations concerning late approval of food aid in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, and Somalia and the failure of some food to reach those in need.

The first report concentrates on the relative slowness of the emergency food aid approval, procurement, and shipping procedures in 1984. It noted that FFP was giving high priority to accelerating the process and working with USDA on improving the process through pre-positioning of bulk grain and bags at various locations and procuring processed foods in advance of emergency orders on a test basis.

The second report discusses such obstacles to rapid distribution of food as transportation factors, late arrival of food and insufficient monitoring, as well as the need for stricter controls over the sale of emergency commodities. The report recommended that distribution plans be reviewed and agreement reached with cooperating sponsors before commodities arrive in a country. On May 1, 1986, FFP advised the Administrator that it was taking steps to improve the implementation and administration of PL 480 emergency assistance along the lines suggested by GAO. The AID Inspector General will review the PL 480 food programs in Somalia in the near future.

FFP has supported the development of a new food assessment methodology that is intended to incorporate both macro and micro needs assessment. Used in several African countries during the

famine, the methodology involves the collection of standard information and its systematic analysis to arrive at food needs. This approach should enable FFP to program food assistance in response to a more comprehensive analysis of factors affecting food needs.

FFP has developed a good system for tracking the progress and location of its food shipments. The major gap, and one that is receiving priority attention, is in the tracking of shipments after they leave ports abroad. Difficulties arise because of poor information sources and the multiple recipients and transporters. To fill this particular gap, the Government of Canada used volunteer food monitors to stay with the food shipments from the time they left Canadian ports until the food was distributed to the ultimate recipients. In a program as large and complex as AID's, the number of monitors required would make that system impractical. But the number of contracts for in-country food monitoring and management could be increased, particularly when cross-border shipments are involved. Inland tracking could reduce diversion and unnecessary slow-downs.

7. DONOR RELATIONS

The United States is only one, albeit the largest, donor that provides assistance when disaster strikes. The relationships among the United States, other donors, and recipient governments should facilitate effective response to crisis. In the African famine, such relationships were fluid and underwent frequent change. This section suggests methods for improving cooperation and coordination among donors and highlights the utility of the specially created U.N. agency for addressing the African famine.

7.1 Cooperation Versus Coordination

Action Recommendation: AID and other donors should define and determine their degree of interest in coordination in general and in specific areas before a disaster hits; they should redefine those relationships in terms of operational necessities later.

Donors consider that their relationships were stronger and more formalized in 1984-1985 than during the earlier 1973-1974 disaster period. The nature of the relationships evidently varied greatly depending on the type and level of programs and the countries and personalities involved. Generally, it would be more correct to speak of cooperation than coordination. The difference is that between information exchanges and the give-and-take leading to mutually compatible and complementary strategies and actions.

The focus on cooperation rather than coordination can be

traced to a number of causes. First, many donors got off to a slow start and for considerable periods of time -- especially in Sudan -- had nothing to coordinate, while U.S. assistance efforts were already in full swing.

Second, there was late agreement among donors on the extent of relief measures required. This was due to several factors rather than to any single cause: honest technical differences at the expert level that were due, in turn, to the lack of common methodologies and differences in when and where the assessments were done; different treatment of host country data; inertia and budgetary concerns at policy levels; and, in the case of some European donors, the need to balance bilateral contributions with their positions in the EEC forum. Thus, although there was no lack of gap/needs assessments, they failed frequently to lead to a consensus during the earlier phases of the emergency.

Third, in the absence of formal channels for reconciling differing estimates, it took time to organize more systematic modes of cooperation and exchanges of information. These led eventually to closer agreement on the extent of the emergency and the relief actions necessary.

The AID Administrator was, nationally and internationally, one of the first policy officials to recognize the enormity of the impending disaster and of the relief operations required. In his capacity as the President's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance, the Administrator, more than anyone else, took the initiative in mobilizing other major donors.

7.2 AID Contacts With Other Donors

AID contacts with other donors were handled in several ways. High-level policy matters were generally the domain of the Administrator. Just below him, operational policies were largely handled by the Chairman of the Inter-Agency Task Force and by his senior associates. Most of these responsibilities were subsequently assumed by the head of the Drought Coordination Staff and its senior staff. Although this unit, the successor to the State-Department/AID Task Force, was moved into the Africa Bureau in late 1985, its chief acted as the Administrator's de facto special assistant for African relief matters. Other AID offices that have year-round dealings with the donor community such as the Office of Food for Peace (FFP) and the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) intensified their contacts, reflecting the magnitude of the relief operations.

The question has been raised why relations with the donor community were not conducted by the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination. Evidently, this would have added more players to the panoply of offices already involved, increased intra-AID coordination problems, and required a great deal of staff time by officers who were neither familiar with the specifics of African relief issues nor had the time to follow the evolution

of the crisis. Under these circumstances, the decision to remand donor relations to those involved full-time in the day-by-day management of the emergency was fully justified.

7.3 The U.N. Office of Emergency Operations in Africa

Action Recommendation: The effectiveness of the U.N. Office of Emergency Operations in Africa (UNOEEOA) in the latter stages of the crisis speaks for the replication of this model in any future emergency.

The absence of a formal international coordinating mechanism continued until December 1984 when UNOEEOA was established. It formalized intra-U.N. coordination and provided a focal point for the international donor community, the private sector (including nongovernmental organizations), and African governments. UNOEEOA's terms of reference summarize its objective as follows: "To ensure that the external assistance required to meet emergency needs is provided in the most timely and effective manner possible."

Conceptually, UNOEEOA had two characteristics: it was time-limited for the duration of the emergency and all staff were detailed from participating U.N. organizations. Both factors gave assurance that the office would not take on a life of its own and thus encroach on established "turfs." The strong Director, concurrently head of the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), was fully familiar with the U.N. system and his imminent retirement further allayed lingering bureaucratic concerns. The AID Administrator, the State Department/AID Task Force staff, and donors found it extremely useful to be able to communicate with one office. This entity had a broad overview and specific information regarding the perceptions and activities of the U.N. system as well as of other donors involved in the relief operation.

African governments favor the continuation of UNOEEOA on a permanent basis or its indefinite extension. Officials of bilateral donor agencies, including AID, generally favor delaying the closeout of the office (originally set for March 31, 1986 but changed to October 31, 1986) to span one more harvest season. The concern of other U.N. organizations for autonomy of management and earlier assurances that UNOEEOA would not be institutionalized affect UNOEEOA's longevity (barring a new disaster). It may be well to remember that AID has adopted similar policies in disbanding the Inter-Agency Task Force and the Drought Coordination Staff and turning over residual responsibilities to existing offices.

UNOEEOA is conducting an internal study of its operations prior to closing. The UNOEEOA experience should be used to revise current terms of reference and operating procedures. The amended versions should serve as standby measures, ready to be activated in case of another emergency.

7.4 Donor Relations in the Field

Action Recommendation: Donors should tailor their coordinating mechanisms in each stricken country to the resources that could be marshaled by donors and host countries.

Donors tended to consider one another's style as secretive. At least for the earlier periods of the emergency, this seems to have been AID's perception of Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and European Economic Community (EEC) activities. Conversely, these and most other donors perceived AID as "the big boy on the block," willing to coordinate others but unable or unwilling to submit to coordination by others. The case of Sudan is frequently cited by donors in Rome, Geneva, and Brussels. AID points to its leadership in recognizing the crisis in the western areas of Sudan and the moral and practical impossibility of delaying relief actions until the U.N. agencies and others could agree on a course of action.

Conversely, the case of Ethiopia is generally hailed as an outstanding international coordination success. A great deal of credit is given to the early assignment of a U.N. Assistant Secretary-General, by all accounts an outstanding individual. In contrast, alleged personality conflicts aside, his counterpart in the Sudan arrived relatively late in the crisis. By that time, major positions had already been taken by USAID.

U.N. officials underline the importance of assigning an Assistant Secretary-General to major disaster countries. The prestige factor associated with the title in dealings with the U.N. agencies as well as with host countries and other donors is obvious. Although U.N. Resident Representatives are officially vested with a "first among equals" role, this authority is limited to the often token role of presiding over meetings of the U.N. development agencies. In contrast, an Assistant Secretary General, as the Secretary-General's personal emissary, and without links to any particular U.N. agency, exercises stewardship over all U.N. agencies. This includes notably the office of the U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), which is not considered a development agency. The latter had major responsibilities in both Ethiopia and Sudan because of the vast numbers of refugees and returnees in those countries. UNHCR functions, at times, were almost indistinguishable from the mandates of other U.N. agencies, such as UNICEF and the World Food Program (WFP), and could have given rise to more than occasional bureaucratic impasses had it not been for the presence of the Secretary-General's delegate.

Local cooperation in the Sahel was generally successful, although there were country-specific nuances. In contrast to 1973-1974, shipments were sufficiently coordinated to eliminate port congestion. The cooperation of USAID Missions, the AID

Regional Economic Development Services Office, WFP, and the U.N. Resident Representative in Abidjan largely prevented costly competition for storage and trucking facilities. Residual problems were due to such factors as host countries' differing priorities, bureaucratic inertia, and laws not adapted to emergency conditions. These problems are discussed in other parts of this report.

Situations varied according to the personality and prestige of the U.N. Resident Representative or other U.N. agency head who assumed the lead role among donors. Another factor was the degree of leadership exercised by the host country. Some were anxious to be the focal point for all matters of donor assistance. Others preferred a donor-by-donor approach and tended to believe that coordination among donors would jeopardize favorable responses to round-robin requests. One country reported a highly successful coordination model: donors would meet among themselves during alternate weeks and collectively with the host government during the interim weeks to discuss and negotiate donor positions. It became clear that donor cooperation in their own capitals cannot succeed unless it is paralleled in the field in host countries. In fact, even in the absence of specific understandings at the policy level, a great deal of cooperation/coordination can be achieved by local representatives.

7.5 Internationalizing Collaboration

Action Recommendations:

1. Round tables involving donor and host country policy and expert staffs should define the need for technical contributions and how such contributions could be collated. Technical experts should agree on methodologies, criteria, and level of effort. Policy-level officials should consider the consolidation and financing of these various efforts.
2. After consultations with host governments, donors should consider designating lead agencies for specific subjects.
3. AID/Washington should ensure that U.S. representatives are detailed to multidonor missions so that conclusions will be based on common premises.

All of these recommendations assume that donor agencies consider coordination -- not just cooperative exchanges of information -- to be a desirable major objective and instruct their headquarters staff and field representatives accordingly. Available unclassified AID files contain no specific instructions to USAID Mission Directors on this matter. The subject poses a certain dilemma: AID is both the largest bilateral and largest multilateral donor. A case can be made in defense of the thesis

that the donor with the best information, largest staff, and greatest supplies and, frequently, cash funds should set the tone and pattern for slower, less endowed, and often less committed donors. However, young countries often prefer to be counseled by "neutral" international agencies rather than to give the appearance of surrendering to bilateral pressures. This may especially hold true when unpopular policy measures (e.g., reduction of subsidies for urban cereal prices) are to be instituted. Developing countries are quick to charge bilateral donors with motives that involve political self-interest rather than purely humanitarian concerns. Such allegations are much rarer in the case of international organizations of which the countries themselves are members.

Thus, the question of what profile U.S. assistance should assume becomes a balance-of-advantage equation that must be solved on a case-by-case basis. Providing unpopular advice under cover of an international organization or a coordinated donor approach may be slower but could, in the long run, be more effective and lasting.

Section 4 of this report discusses duplication of efforts in such areas as early warning systems. Many donors are designing and operating aspects of such systems. AID has taken the lead in developing a single system that combines agriculture-related data, collected through both high-technology remote-sensing equipment and on-the-ground observation, and socioeconomic data. AID must now decide to what extent it is willing to rely on data furnished by others in exchange for its own information so that consolidated information is available to serve as the basis for multilateral evaluations and actions. International computer networks are already linking the major organizations, permitting continuous communication. However, some people in AID and other agencies show little interest in going beyond the cooperation stage (i.e., exchange of information), believing that assessments and conclusions should be left to each participant. Yet budget constraints, waning public interest in the African famine, and the probability that assistance priorities will shift to other concerns all argue for contingency planning to reduce independent data production and evaluation to the minimum.

Another area that could benefit from greater coordination is reporting on food shipments. Several organizations, including AID, have extensive information-gathering systems. The FAO and WFP data systems could be expanded and structured to meet the needs of the entire donor community. The data collection effort is currently being expanded to include shipments by nongovernmental organizations. FAO bases its "Foodcrops and Shortages" reports on information supplied by its Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture. WFP considers its approach to be sufficiently advanced to move from the passive mode of simply recording data to actively calling shipments forward (based on their Bangladesh model).

Inherent in the entire process of internationalized cooperation, however, is the need to involve host countries in

all stages of decision-making.

8. THE ROLE OF PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS AND THE COMMERCIAL SECTOR

While the U.S. Government financed tons of food and scores of nonfood projects in Africa to fight the scourge of famine, the wheat and milk and blankets were transported by private shipping lines aided by private freight forwarders; on arrival in-country, they were often transported by local private trucking companies into the hands of over 25 private voluntary organizations. Those organizations then assumed responsibility for distributing the assistance to the residents in camps and villages, ensuring that the food and other supplies actually reached those in need. USAID Missions provided funding and logistic assistance and intervened with governments where necessary to smooth the way; ultimately, however, it was the dedication and toil of U.S. and other private voluntary organizations that saved Africa from the further ravages of famine. They are still there -- feeding, tending to the sick, and implementing recovery projects. They will remain even as the rains herald bountiful harvests.

8.1 Private Voluntary Organizations

Action Recommendations:

1. To make more effective use of the varied abilities and interests of U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in the next crisis, in-country coordinating mechanisms must be developed, preferably by the host government; in the alternative, coordination must be headed by international organizations or PVOs themselves.
2. A joint AID-PVO group should be established in Washington for coordination and proposal screening purposes.
3. Block grant allocations should be made to USAID Missions for rapid funding of PVO proposals up to \$250,000.
4. In selected instances, AID should consider making block grants directly to PVOs.

This section presents a model of how PVOs can more effectively provide assistance to those in need in the next crisis. The model includes an in-country component, an AID/Washington component, and a communications system linking the two. It has been developed based on an analysis of problems that most affected PVO operations during the 1984-1986 famine. The model acknowledges that PVOs vary greatly in size, assets, interests,

and capabilities; that sponsorship is often church-connected, although not always; that some PVOs, through years of work in specific countries, have staked out their claims; and that others are newcomers attracted by the opportunity to assist those in need.

8.1.1 In-Country Coordination

As the community of PVOs becomes more sophisticated and experienced, there is an increasing inclination for individual groups to stake out their territory (an entire country or certain provinces) and attempt to carry on independently. Many are capable of such independent operations, but this approach runs the danger of leaving some areas of need and large numbers of people untended. To make matters worse, there is no organized method of sharing information about needs and plans for meeting those needs. Two recent Government Accounting Office (GAO) reports (March 1986, April 1986) found that the better the PVO planning, the more efficient was the overall operation.

The ideal situation occurs when the host government has a well-organized central office capable of coordinating all famine assistance. Not many governments in Africa today boast such resources. During the 1984-1986 crisis, a good example was provided by the Ethiopian Government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. For the refugee crisis that began in 1979 and continues in 1986, Somalia has had a similar group. In Niger and Zimbabwe, government coordination efforts worked well. Officials decided what assistance was needed, requested specific PVOs to assist, and made territorial and duty assignments. Many PVO assignments were extensions of their ongoing involvement in the country.

In the ideal situation, a host government coordinator would "call forward" PVOs on the basis of their demonstrated interests and capabilities and give them assignments based on dependable information about the experience, strengths, assets, and previous records of PVOs wanting to help. If such information is made available through USAID Missions, it can be verified early by the government.

If a government does not have such a coordination unit, alternatives are listed below in order of preference:

- An international organization such as the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), UNICEF, or a representative of the U.N. Secretary-General
- A bilateral donor, usually the one with the greatest number of PVOs in the country
- A single, experienced PVO willing to coordinate its peers or to assist the government in its coordination efforts

- A PVO coordinating committee representing all PVOs in-country, regardless of nationalities
- A private contractor employed by the host government to assist it in coordinating efforts

These options for in-country coordination could be combined. For example, in the early 1980s, the Government of Somalia asked Africare to provide managerial and logistic support to its coordinating body. In this current crisis, when there was no single host government entity, PVOs often responded to the coordinating efforts of an Assistant U.N. Secretary-General or a local donor.

Effective coordination requires that PVOs be prepared to make a disciplined response. First, PVOs must make available to the coordinating body all pertinent information about their capabilities, special interests, and assets, especially resources they could access (e.g., participation in the PL 480 Title II program, provision of doctors and nurses). PVOs should develop plans according to guidelines provided by the coordinating group. That group should approve such plans even though they are viewed as fluid because of the nature of the crisis. Those plans should include a statement of specific objectives in terms of end products or services and numbers of intended beneficiaries; an implementation approach that identifies specific tasks, staffing to accomplish those tasks, and a timetable; and a management design that allows for monitoring and making adjustments as needed. Plans should identify when and how in-country transportation assets are to be used and present a contingency option if those resources are unavailable. Finally, the plans should include a provision for relating delivery of resources to the number of people actually assisted.

To those who would complain about tight reins and too much paperwork in the midst of efforts to save the dying, the answer is that the responsibility for handling billions of U.S. Government assets entails proper planning, implementation, and reporting. PVO staffs should include those who can perform such tasks.

In normal times, most PVOs carry out their food distribution, maternal and child health care, family planning, and other activities somewhat distant from the USAID Mission. Evidently both prefer it that way. Funding is usually from regional or central sources and does not impinge on the USAID Mission budget. PVOs turn to the Mission only in times of particular need (e.g., problems with local officials). But in a fast-breaking famine crisis, all that changes. PVOs, the commercial sector, and USAID Missions become sources of the latest information on country needs assessments for Washington. Each Mission transmits information on assistance plans for the country back to the PVO community. Further, the USAID Mission assumes an active role with the host government on behalf of PVOs to relieve bottlenecks, whether bureaucratic or logistic; it often finds itself in the middle of jurisdictional squabbles; and it is called upon by

the PVOs to prod Washington to authorize increased shipments or more in-country transportation assets.

USAID Missions are often unwilling partners in these activities, but they cannot escape their responsibilities. Naming a member of the staff as PVO liaison early on is necessary. Some of this burden could be lessened by an outside coordinating mechanism; in the absence of one, the USAID Mission plays that role to some extent for the U.S. PVOs. (The suggestion for an expanded role for USAID Missions is discussed below as an extension of the Washington effort with PVOs.)

8.1.2 AID/Washington Coordination

As a result of their participation in Title II feeding efforts mandated by Sections 201 and 202 of PL 480, and their participation in ongoing AID activities urged by Congress in Section 123 of the Foreign Assistance Act, PVOs have long enjoyed entree to many offices in AID/Washington.

The Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance is the major contact for most. There PVOs deal with two offices, one for Private and Voluntary Cooperation and one for Title II, Food for Peace. In the former, PVOs register as required by statute, submit their qualifications as PVOs, and seek the variety of grants that the office administers. For food assistance projects, PVOs submit their requests to the Title II office. In addition, PVOs have contacts with AID geographic bureaus, where they obtain approval for country-specific projects to be funded directly from bureau or USAID Mission funds rather than central funds. There is also an Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, which is concerned with overall PVO participation in AID activities. It holds meetings throughout the year to further AID-PVO collaboration. In disaster situations, PVOs work closely with the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).

In this famine crisis, PVOs dealt with all their usual contacts, including OFDA. A membership organization of about 120 PVOs called Interaction was represented on the Inter-Agency Task Force by the president of the organization or his representative. Many of the PVOs that were active in the various countries suffering from famine belonged to Interaction. The Interaction representative was able to share information with the PVOs and bring to the attention of the Inter-Agency Task Force specific problems facing PVOs.

As the recovery phase began, PVOs found themselves dealing with an increased number of officials. Particularly frustrating was the approval process required for funding recovery projects. Some PVOs did not know where to submit such requests -- in the field to USAID Missions; to the Africa Bureau, their traditional contact for such country-specific activities; to OFDA, which seemed to have control of most of the nonfood budget; or to the

Office for Private and Voluntary Cooperation, another traditional contact. Many were unacquainted with proposal requirements.

The Canadian experience, discussed in Section 5.3, provides some insights into a proposed model for AID. Because Canada does not maintain missions abroad, it relies heavily on its nongovernmental organization community. Early in this crisis, it invited this community to set up a parallel group to the government's coordinating unit. The group included on its board two Canadian government officials. The primary purpose of this group was to coordinate the activities of all nongovernmental organizations; a secondary task was to review all nongovernmental organizations' proposals for funding relief and recovery projects. According to participants, the peer group review, participated in by the Government officials but dominated by nongovernmental organization members, was more rigorous than the usual Government review process during normal times.

In the next crisis, a joint AID-PVO mechanism should be established for coordinating Washington responses to PVOs. It could be established as a subgroup of the Inter-Agency Task Force or sponsored by the Advisory Committee on Private and Voluntary Aid. Either group, with adequate guidelines, could act as an initial review or screening group for proposals submitted by PVOs. This would give PVOs a central office in AID/Washington to which they could initially submit their proposals so that obvious omissions could be identified and corrected before submission to the appropriate bureau office for final approval. This group, especially if it were a subgroup of the task force directing the U.S. response to the next famine, would be able to share information with the PVOs and act as a clearing-house for handling PVO problems.

In the next crisis, the responsibility for reviewing and approving recovery proposals should be given to the entity that is ultimately responsible for monitoring those efforts and reporting on their impact to Congress -- the geographic bureau or the USAID Mission, not to OFDA. Longer term recovery efforts are not part of OFDA's mission.

Time was lost in this past crisis when even the smallest proposal had to be cleared first in Washington. To avoid this in the future, the geographic bureau should make block grants available to USAID Missions with the authority to approve PVO proposals for relief and recovery up to a maximum amount of \$250,000. A review of relief and recovery project statistics indicates that of 160 or more projects funded by the \$135 million out of the 1985 supplemental appropriation, over 40 percent were below \$250,000. AID should also consider making such block grants directly to selected PVOs based on their experience and record.

To make this process work, clear guidelines for project approval must be sent to USAID Missions; additional staff must be available to Missions requesting it for this purpose; and information concerning approvals should be sent to Washington

within 5 days of obligations. Desk offices would then pass the information to the task force, the relevant regional bureau if the task force is not located there, and OFDA if its funds are used.

Proposals over \$250,000 would be submitted to AID/Washington through the joint committee, with information copies sent to the appropriate USAID Mission so that its views could be made available to Washington. Adequate guidelines for review should be prepared for Washington use.

8.2 Allocation of Funds

Action Recommendation: AID should initially divide project funds equally into relief and recovery categories to provide flexibility and establish country priorities.

In the process of approving and funding nonfood assistance, decisions must be made on the division of funds between relief and recovery and the rate of obligations. At the beginning of a crisis, it is extremely difficult to predict what portion of available funds will be needed for relief and what portion for the recovery phase. An analysis of the allocations of the \$135 million for relief and recovery projects from the 1985 supplemental appropriation shows that they were nearly equally divided between the two categories. Such distribution could serve as a rough guide for the future. Thus, a portion of the available funds could be allocated to OFDA for initial obligation for relief projects and the balance to the geographic bureau for recovery projects. Then country priorities should be determined based on the following:

- Extent of food deficits and health needs
- Resources each host country can bring to bear on the problem
- Level of other donor assistance

Within these parameters, OFDA and the regional bureau will each be faced with adjusting the pace of obligations. (In this past crisis, the Office of Management and Budget expressed its preference for a measured pace to avoid the necessity for another supplemental appropriation. This is possible in the recovery phase but not in the relief phase, where time is critical.) The process of first come first served will control obligation rates in many instances. However, the basic criteria should be the intrinsic worth of the project and the priority of the country or countries to be affected by the project.

8.3 Transportation Issues

Action Recommendations:

1. AID should maintain a flexible policy with respect to the use of authorized Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) funds for inland transportation of food during emergencies. Any decision should take into consideration funds raised by PVOs from appeals related to an ongoing crisis.
2. PVO requests to distribute food shipments should include details of available transportation assets and anticipated shortages.

Two problems caused serious difficulties within the PVO community: payments for inland transportation of assistance and insufficient transportation assets. Traditionally, the local currency cost of inland transportation of food assistance is borne by host countries. In this crisis, the costs became so enormous because of washouts, breakdowns, and the long distances involved that Congress amended Section 203 of PL 480 in 1984 to permit CCC to pay for inland transportation from ports abroad to final distribution sites. In 1984, OFDA used \$16 million from a special appropriation to cover such costs. In 1985, AID used CCC funds to pay up to 100 percent of inland transportation costs, depending on local situations. In 1986, after the success of large PVO fund-raising events, AID reduced the U.S. Government portion to 50 percent. It is now reviewing that policy. Small PVOs objected to being lumped in with the big fund raisers, and all feared that the policy would become a precedent for the future.

On balance, when PVOs receive tax-deductible contributions from American individuals on the basis of PVO appeals tied directly to an ongoing crisis, it is not inappropriate to require them to use at least a portion of that money for costs the host country or U.S. Government might otherwise have to bear. Nevertheless, the ability to use CCC funds gave AID a method by which it could ease the burden on host countries faced with famine-related expenditures, or who found their logistics systems disrupted by civil strife. It will be a valuable tool in future crises.

After food assistance arrived in-country or in ports of discharge, major delays occurred because of lack of sufficient transportation, especially trucks. In Ethiopia and Sudan, this was a particular problem. For the future, PVO plans for offering assistance in moving food should include projected transportation needs and proposals for acquiring them in ample time. Determining what assets are or will become available in a crisis depends on data developed and maintained before crises arise (by the WFP logistics survey, for example, an ongoing program).

8.4 The Commerical Sector

Action Recommendations:

1. AID should review options for expanding the role of the U.S. commercial sector in providing transportation and logistics services in a future emergency.
2. AID should commission a survey of relevant U.S. firms to develop a famine assistance resource inventory that can be drawn upon in a future crisis.
3. AID should foster the creation of a system for channeling U.S. corporate resources into efforts to eliminate world hunger.

8.4.1 Increasing the Role of the Commercial Sector

The U.S. and African commercial sectors played an important role in this crisis, primarily in transportation and logistics. Some individual contractors were engaged by USAID Missions and regional offices to assist in port-clearing and expediting shipments. A private firm provided helicopters for airlifting food shipments in Sudan.

In these and similar areas there are opportunities for increased commercial sector involvement. American transportation experts should be contracted in a similar situation to assess potential bottlenecks and recommend steps for alleviating them. They could also identify U.S. firms with special expertise in solving difficult transportation problems.

Not all recovery projects are within the scope of PVO capabilities. Some special areas of recovery may be handled by the U.S. commercial sector. In those situations, contractors should be invited to submit proposals.

In the area of early warning systems, there are several types of contributions that can be made by the commercial sector. From a technical standpoint, U.S. firms can help create a more efficient system. According to an article in the March 18, 1986 Wall Street Journal, one of the major U.S. satellite systems, NOAA's Landsat, was sold to the private sector (a partnership of Hughes Aircraft Company and RCA). Furthermore, whatever the early warning system, the commercial sector, both U.S. and host country, can serve as additional information sources of socio-economic data. On the U.S. side, ocean shippers could provide details about port conditions, the soundness of ships for particular cargoes, and similar information. On the host country side, retailers could report drops in sales, trucking companies could note increased fuel prices, and abattoirs could point to increased selling off of animals.

Private contractors could provide more of the temporary

personnel needed overseas in times of crisis. Indefinite quantity contracts could be amended to provide for assignments of longer than 4 months in times of U.S. response to crisis.

Another area for commercial sector involvement is in designing preparedness plans and training host government officials in their implementation. Not only is it important to have data from an early warning system about an impending crisis, but it is necessary to have plans for response in cases where efforts to avert disaster fail.

Overall, AID's use of the commercial sector in areas other than transportation and logistics was not extensive, despite that sector's resources that could be utilized in times of famine crisis. (Witness its response in times of domestic emergencies.) The problem is to determine what resources are available and from whom. To this end, an inventory of resources available from the U.S. commercial sector should be developed and updated periodically. OFDA now maintains a list of its suppliers of emergency material and services. That list could be used as the core for an extended effort.

8.4.2 Preventing Hunger

In Section 2 the causes of famine are discussed. Section 10 suggests concerted international action to reduce those causes and notes that private sector involvement is desirable. Some interest has recently been evidenced by the U.S. corporate community in taking steps to alleviate hunger in the world. But no group has put forward a concrete plan on how to do it. Two groups, the International Management and Development Institute and an offshoot, Corporations to End World Hunger Foundation, approached AID to discuss funding to underwrite their formative efforts. Subsequently, the International Management and Development Institute dropped out of that effort.

The National Security Council is sponsoring efforts to coordinate private and government concerns on African hunger and development. Although the causes of famine are inevitably intertwined with government policies, thus making them less amenable to an entrepreneurial approach, there is ample room for the application of specific expert skills to areas such as agriculture and health. That expertise is available in the commercial sector and in universities and foundations. The entrepreneurial approach may be better suited to joint efforts to increase economic and development growth.

8.4.3 Assisting Economic Growth

The investment dollar goes where the climate is attractive: countries in which taxes are low, labor is plentiful, skilled, and cheap; red tape is minimal; and the sources of water or

electric power are ample. Not all foreign investment encourages development, however. Industries that depend on maximum repatriation of profits, use nonreplaceable natural resources, and are capital intensive are examples of investments that do not encourage development. What is needed are industries that are labor-intensive, emphasize training and upgrading of skills, and reinvest profits in the country. Those industries need encouragement to explore investment possibilities. AID's Bureau for Private Enterprise specializes in such activities. The goal would be to interest appropriate U.S. firms in forming joint ventures in African countries. It is not an easy road -- African countries are not presently attractive to the investment community, given the continent's record of civil war, weak governments, parastatal solutions to development problems, and perennial foreign debt. African governments must seek assistance in those basic areas before they look for increased private foreign investment.

9. RELATIONS WITH THE PUBLIC AND CONGRESS

Good relationships with the public directly and through the press and with Congress after passage of supplemental legislation are important elements of a successful famine relief and recovery program. A great deal of time and effort was expended in providing information to each audience about the U.S. response to the African famine. The mechanics and procedures used to share information during the African famine largely accomplished their intended objectives. Action recommendations focus on refining these earlier efforts and developing better systems for obtaining needed information.

9.1 Dealing With the Press

Action Recommendations:

1. AID and the State Department should develop a comprehensive public affairs strategy when an emergency is recognized and the decision is made that the United States will respond. That strategy should be revised as circumstances change.
2. Guidance regarding press contact should be given to AID/Washington and field personnel immediately after there is agreement that the United States will respond to a famine. That guidance should be revised if the U.S. response extends over more than 6 months.

The nature of press coverage of the African famine can be characterized in three phases: (1) early attention to U.S. special assistance efforts to address the food shortages in Africa (pre-October 1984); (2) a barrage of press inquiries when

the horrors of the famine came to the attention of much of the world, largely as a result of a BBC broadcast (October 1984-June 1985); and (3) reduced press interest as other events captured the attention of the media (post-June 1985). AID's External Affairs Bureau was prepared to handle the first and third phases and less prepared to handle the second phase.

AID's External Affairs Bureau mounted an active public information campaign well in advance of the broad public and press awareness of the emergency (phase one). For example, a January 30, 1984 news release summarized the press conference held that day by the AID Administrator and the Secretary of State to address the U.S. response and the growing food shortage in Africa.

A memo from the Deputy Assistant Administrator for External Affairs reflects the need to alter the public affairs strategy as press attention given to famine was waning (phase three). This memo requests a "brain storming" session with key AID players involved in implementing the U.S. response to develop an approach to maintaining public awareness of U.S. efforts.

During the heightened press coverage of phase two, however, a comprehensive strategy was not fully in place. Partly, this reflected the suddenness with which the African famine and responses to it rocketed to the forefront of public world attention. At the height of the famine there was a rush of food assistance to Africa, which created a situation in which information was rarely valid for more than a day. To respond to as many as 50 telephone calls per day from journalists and to provide guidance for the daily State Department briefing scheduled at noon, the External Affairs Bureau prepared and updated guidance daily by 10:30 a.m.

Other ramifications of such widespread press coverage were not immediately apparent. For example, considerable time was required to organize press guidance statements for the variety of officials who commented on events related to the African famine and the U.S. response, including the AID Administrator and the Director of the Inter-Agency Task Force. As issues were identified, the strategy was modified to take account of them. The advantage for responding to a future famine, particularly in terms of the role of the External Affairs Bureau regarding press coverage at the height of the emergency, is that guidance regarding the various issues has been developed and can be drawn upon as needed. The Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for External Affairs sent two information memoranda to the AID Administrator discussing recommendations on the following topics:

- Information coordination between and among the full-time members of the State Department/AID Task Force, the Africa Bureau, AID's offices of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), AID's Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance (FVA), the Missions, and the External Affairs Bureau to improve the flow of information among these groups and the External Affairs

Bureau

- Information coordination between AID and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) in the field
- AID field staff contact with the press
- Preparation procedures for press briefings by the AID Administrator

Information coordination between the External Affairs Bureau and other AID offices and USAID Missions could be improved if each provided more information to the other. For example, the External Affairs Bureau should receive copies of cable traffic from AID staff in Africa and should issue daily news clippings on the famine to senior full-time members of the State Department/AID Task Force.

To enhance information coordination among key AID/Washington offices and the full-time staff of the specially created State Department/AID Task Force, a representative of the External Affairs Bureau was added to the key advisory group composed of officials from each unit that met with the Administrator as needed. That representative could become aware of key issues and decisions and could also identify potential public affairs opportunities.

As massive relief efforts were mounted in Ethiopia and Sudan, with consequent keen attention paid by the press in the field, it was suggested that senior USIA public affairs officers assist in managing the press coverage. Thus, expert experience could be brought to bear on contacts with the press in the field. This USIA resource should be used for future emergencies under similar circumstances.

The discussion of press contact in the memos focused on AID field staff. The External Affairs Bureau prepared specific guidance, which it sent by cable to AID field staff in May 1985. Basically, field staff were asked to keep AID/Washington informed both of plans to do a press interview and of information presented in the interview. With sufficient lead time, AID/Washington could provide the field staff with guidance and prepare for followup inquiries from the interview. Guidance for AID field staff should have been developed and issued earlier.

On the Washington side, Handbook 18 provides specific guidance on who may talk to the press and what to do when a reporter calls someone who is not authorized to speak for the Agency. Although this guidance was circulated in the Agency to remind staff of procedures regarding reporters, it should have been circulated sooner and reissued periodically to reinforce the understanding of Agency guidance regarding the press.

The final category of information addressed in the memos concerns press briefings conducted by the AID Administrator. Suggestions were made for ways to improve the amount of

preparation that could be accomplished in the limited time available before a scheduled briefing.

9.2 Working With Congress

Action Recommendations:

1. In addition to fulfilling specific Congressional reporting requirements, AID should initiate information sharing with Congress through the use of briefings and fact sheets.
2. Responsibility for preparation of fact sheets should be given to the Development Planning Office of the Africa Bureau.

Congressional reporting requirements concerned with the 1985 supplemental appropriation included the following:

- Congressional notification 5 days prior to each obligation of any of the \$135 million disaster relief and recovery funds, except if the emergency was considered life threatening and required immediate action
- A report describing emergency food and nonfood needs in Africa and the projected FY 1985 U.S. Government contribution (due June 30, 1985)
- A report describing the assistance provided with supplemental appropriations funds (due September 30, 1985)
- Presidential certification that the \$225 million reserve funds for Title II food and its transport were essential to famine relief in Africa, and a plan for the use of those funds submitted by the AID Administrator

In addition to meeting these requirements, significant effort was devoted to keeping Congress informed by providing briefings and fact sheets. Briefings for both Congress and the press were given frequently in the early stages of heightened U.S. response. According to some Congressional staff and some reporters for such publications as the Washington Post and the New York Times, briefings were offered too frequently to add substantive new information. In light of these views, informal meetings were conducted with interested members of Congress and their staffs and with the press when appropriate. Between meetings, the Administrator and other AID staff were available to Congress and the press on a one-to-one basis.

Fact sheets were developed to provide Congress with periodic updates of U.S. efforts. Topics included total food aid, identification of countries most seriously affected, a list of emergency food approvals by country, a list of disaster relief and recovery approvals, special situation descriptions (e.g.,

port congestion in Ethiopia), and a detailed breakdown of emergency and regular PL 480 assistance, Section 416 assistance, and disaster relief and recovery assistance by country. During the peak of U.S. assistance, fact sheets were prepared twice monthly. These same fact sheets were also used to provide information to the press and the public. Generally, they provided the basic facts for each group to adapt to its needs.

Because the original purpose of fact sheets was to inform Congress, responsibility for their preparation was given to AID's Office of Legislative Affairs. The staff collected information from a variety of AID offices in order to prepare the fact sheets. The information required clearances by the various country desks, which could be obtained more easily by Africa program staff. In a similar situation, responsibility for the preparation of the fact sheets should be given to the Development Planning Office of the Africa Bureau, which normally collects and maintains program and project data.

Besides fulfilling formal reporting requirements and providing additional information to Congress through briefings and fact sheets, AID responded to special requests from Congress for information. At times, requests concerned implementation issues: were sufficient trucks available to distribute food and supplies; were sufficient medical supplies available; what amount of inland transportation should be paid by PVOs delivering U.S.-provided food and nonfood assistance?

The forced resettlement issue in Ethiopia led to consideration of a variety of bills in Congress. Options under review included working with the U.N. and other donors to monitor resettlement and imposing economic sanctions. AID has contributed a variety of inputs on this issue as well as on other pending legislation, such as the design of a substantial recovery appropriation bill to help Africa overcome problems that caused the previous famine.

Although AID indeed exerted considerable effort in providing information to Congress, this effort was elicited as a result of the great Congressional interest in the substantial U.S. Government famine relief and recovery effort. Stakes were high -- millions of lives hung in the balance and the U.S. Government had agreed to provide an average of 50 percent of the needed food assistance. Under similar circumstances in the future, AID can assume that Congressional inquiries will extend beyond official reporting requirements. To the extent that AID can anticipate questions by providing answers in briefings on significant topics and in fact sheets, additional Congressional requests may be minimized.

9.3 Getting Credit for U.S. Government Contributions

Action Recommendations:

1. AID should include examples of U.S. successes and

evidence of the impact of U.S. assistance on recipients in the materials sent out in response to public inquiries. These materials should also acknowledge problems, even if the problems have received substantial press coverage.

2. AID should encourage PVOs to acknowledge U.S. Government contributions in their press interviews and in their brochures, and AID should acknowledge and illustrate the extent of private efforts in the materials it issues to the public.

Despite the efforts of AID's Bureau for External Affairs, information concerning two areas was not well communicated to the general public: (1) the success of U.S. efforts and the impact of U.S. aid on recipients and (2) the extent of the U.S. Government contribution to famine relief and recovery in Africa. In the first area, AID developed a set of materials to be used in responding to U.S. public inquiries. They consisted of a form letter, a statement from the President, a reprint of an article by the AID Administrator, and a list of PVOs that were assisting in the Ethiopian relief effort, including a brief description of the type of assistance provided by each. More than 12,000 concerned citizens wrote to the President or members of Congress, primarily asking how much the U.S. Government was doing to address the rampant famine in Africa. Reflecting this perspective, the basic form letter describes monies spent, monies earmarked, and programs created to address the famine. Specific questions were answered in a special paragraph in the form letter.

The letter was signed by the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of External Affairs and issued on letterhead that identified AID in Washington, D.C. The letter might more appropriately have been issued under signature of the AID Administrator, with his additional identification as the President's Special Coordinator for African Famine Relief and Recovery.

No examples of the impact of U.S. Government assistance were included in the form letter or in any of the other materials typically enclosed with the form letter. Such examples should be included in the future. A discussion of problems encountered and efforts to resolve them, whether successful or not, should also be included. AID's credibility is enhanced when problems are identified in the documents, particularly when those receiving the material may already know about the problems because of press coverage. Furthermore, successes and problems together provide a more balanced picture.

To remedy the information omissions in the second area, AID should encourage PVOs to identify the U.S. Government as the contributor of virtually all the food they distribute and substantial parts of the nonfood assistance they provide. Similarly, in materials prepared for responses to public inquiries and in AID/State Department press briefings, private sector contributions should be acknowledged, recent examples provided,

and those contributions should be combined with U.S. Government contributions to provide a comprehensive picture of the U.S. response. With each acknowledging the contributions of the other, the focus can be shifted to the overall U.S. contribution rather than the contribution of the U.S. Government or PVOs uniquely. The combined total better illustrates to the American people the extensive public and private commitment made to alleviating the problem. Each side should benefit from the publicity by the other.

9.4 Nonemergency Stories and the Press

Action Recommendations:

1. AID should actively seek press coverage for nonemergency topics like famine prevention.
2. AID should continue its participation in the annual World Food Day event sponsored by the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization.

Although the emergency captured significant press attention, as conditions improved much of their attention was diverted to other subjects. Enlisting the support of the press, or at least its participation, on nonemergency issues is always a challenge.

There is no such thing as too much attention to this need. There was considerable activity in this area during the 1984-1986 period. For example, the press conference by the AID Administrator and Secretary of State in January 1984 focused on the preventive Economic Policy Initiative. Also, the Administrator and other AID officials spoke before numerous groups throughout the course of the drought and famine on the level of need, current initiatives, and steps that must be taken to realize food self-reliance in Africa. The problem was not a lack of AID attention to this issue, but a seeming lack of interest by the press that concentrates on today's crises, not on preventing tomorrow's.

Members of the press provided suggestions on how AID can encourage such press coverage. AID should take the initiative in sharing information with the press about nonemergency topics such as why Africa is unable to meet all its food needs, what kinds of development are needed to avert future famines, and how future famines can be avoided through early warning. One journalist emphasized this point by suggesting that AID should badger the press: "Keep calling; journalists will respond."

At a minimum, AID should continue its participation in the annual World Food Day event. AID and many other U.S. agencies are active participants. Each year the Presidential World Without Hunger Awards are presented to U.S. organizations and individuals for their contributions to ending world hunger.

9.5 An Integrated Data Base

Action Recommendation: A common data base system should be adopted by AID's Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance Bureau, Office of Food for Peace (FFP), Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the relevant regional bureau, the State Department Bureau for Refugee Programs, and even USDA's Stabilization and Conservation Service to record the distribution of all resources in a new famine emergency.

If a commodity sales program, such as the \$90 million in Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) stocks that was made available during the 1984-1986 famine, is proposed to help address a future famine, procedures should be established to incorporate USDA data into any report intended to describe U.S. Government assistance. This requires that the record keeping systems used by AID and USDA at least be compatible.

Considerable effort was required to integrate data available from FFP, OFDA, and the State Department Bureau for Refugee Programs. Each office was responsible for a portion of the funds allocated to address the famine. In addition, OFDA gave a block grant to FVA, and the Africa Bureau chaired the last review of PVO proposals for recovery projects and maintained the records of these transactions. Each of these five offices had a different system for tracking the funds spent to address the famine in Africa. Two of the offices kept their records manually, and the other three used word processing, a microcomputer, and a mainframe, respectively. The information available in each report system required much clarification. Furthermore, many of the variables required recoding so that they could be combined into a single data base. Additional information on intended output (e.g., number of people to be fed, number of blankets to be delivered, number of wells to be dug) typically required reviewing additional documentation, including grant agreements.

To avoid this complicated process in the future, a proposal was developed for creating a common data base for all offices that may be involved in allocating funds for a future U.S. response to a famine. The proposal identifies elements that should be common across all offices reporting. Offices may want to tailor the system for their own use by adding variables of special interest to them.

The benefits of using an integrated data base are several. It facilitates the aggregation of data to identify the total U.S. response. It enables policy and project decision-makers to analyze the U.S. response from a programmatic standpoint and make mid-course adjustments as appropriate. Summary data from the system could be incorporated into fact sheets for Congress, the press, and the general public, as well as more detailed examples of the nature of U.S. Government assistance to provide a more

in-depth picture.

10. TRANSITION TO DEVELOPMENT

Famine relief efforts have ended in most African countries. Of the more than 20 countries in Africa that the United States aided in FY 1985, only four are receiving continued relief in FY 1986: Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique, and Angola. Civil strife saps limited resources in each of the four. Recovery efforts are underway in most countries. Such efforts need to be melded into development activities. Ways of accomplishing this and the roles of donors and host governments in the process comprise the subjects of this section.

10.1 The Setting

Traditionally, droughts and accompanying famines were considered to be naturally occurring events that could not be prevented. Today, there is wide recognition of the strong links between Sub-Saharan droughts and people's abuse of their natural environment. Overcultivation of the land, overgrazing of pastures, overuse of water resources, and rapid deforestation to provide fuelwood are both effects and causes of droughts. Experts, however, disagree on the weight to be accorded to specific factors. In Africa's drought-prone countries this plight has been accompanied by steadily declining prices of raw materials and worsening comparative terms of trade, mounting external debts, inflation, unchecked birthrates, and declining per capita incomes.

As of mid-1986, there is sufficient food available in Africa to feed Africans. The problem is that food is in surplus in some areas and in deficit in others, and its movement to areas of need is difficult at best. African countries with food surpluses have difficulties selling their products to needy neighbors. Even countries with sufficient total food stocks may find it virtually impossible to move food from where it exists in surplus to areas where people go hungry. Sudan is a case in point. In eastern Sudan, food is abundant. In western Sudan, people are starving. Thus, problems beyond improved agricultural production need to be addressed in the postfamine period. These include adverse host government policies, poor infrastructure, weak marketing, limited foreign exchange, depressed world prices for traditional exports, and high birth rates.

Although basically agrarian, some African countries have been losing the capacity to feed themselves even in normal years. Their dependency on commercial food imports and food aid has steadily increased. It is this trend that must be reversed after the present emergency has abated and the immediate ravishes of the disaster have been overcome. Senegal's President Abdou Diouf, as reported in the Washington Post of October 26, 1985,

put it this way: "While emergency aid can help ease the misery of the afflicted peoples and alleviate their suffering, the fact remains that the true solutions to the serious problems the countries afflicted by drought and desertification are facing are medium-term and long-term development solutions."

10.2 Recovery

The term "recovery" generally refers to a return to the situation as it existed before the crisis. In the specific context of the relief operations, activities must be time-limited (generally not longer than 18 months) and may be tied to specific funding sources. Recovery projects are designed to help a government and its population to overcome the effects of the recent disaster more quickly and efficiently. However, a return to previous levels does not require a return to previous methods. On the contrary, the realization that previous methods provided no protection against the recent calamity may have made the people and their governments more receptive to innovations. The linkages of drought/famine conditions to deep-seated structural deficiencies -- going far beyond agroclimatic incidents -- can and should be reflected in approaches to recovery.

A decade of special programming in the Sahel countries to enable them to better cope with famine disasters deserves special assessment. Examining what worked and what did not in the effort to better equip Sahelian countries to handle the 1984-1986 famine can provide useful guidelines for efforts to fortify drought-prone countries against the ravages of future famines.

10.3 Nairobi Round Table

In March 1986, a North-South Round Table in Nairobi was convoked to consider the interrelation of drought, recovery measures, and development. The conferees agreed that the causes and the severity of the recent emergency were related to structural factors such as poor agricultural practices that produce little and unbalance the fragile environment; lack of agricultural credit and extension services; government policies of setting low farm gate prices (favoring urban dwellers), which act as production disincentives; oversupply of donated foods, which also depress prices; and inadequate transportation networks that bar farmers' access to markets, thus discouraging production in good times and impeding relief shipments (from surplus areas) in famine years. Recent and, in the case of Sudan and Ethiopia, still ongoing famine relief operations have brought into focus a number of weaknesses and constraints that impeded the immediate efforts of African countries and of the donor community. In the absence of such obstacles the relief operations would have been more effective, additional people could have been saved, and much-needed assistance would have reached suffering people sooner.

Starting with recovery and phasing into medium- and long-term development programs, it should be the first task of governments and donors to remove these roadblocks. Not only will this improve the opportunities for comprehensive development in general, but this will also ensure that in the case of a new drought, relief efforts will be effective in preventing situations from reaching the famine stage. There are several measures that African countries should and could take with donor assistance.

10.4 The "Africanization" of Early Warning Systems and Relief Efforts

Action Recommendations:

1. Drought-prone countries should establish or strengthen early warning systems as a matter of high national priority for both famine prevention and development planning.
2. Fullest participation by host countries and regional organizations should lead to the earliest possible "Africanization" of the systems.
3. Donors (including AID) should limit their early warning system assistance to elements that surpass host countries' and regional organizations' technical and financial capabilities. Donors should regularly review the capabilities of the host countries and regional organizations to determine what additional improvements are needed.
4. Host governments, AID, and other donors should agree on data collection and assessment criteria and methodologies to avoid duplication and to establish common premises.
5. Studies should be conducted of African countries that were considered success stories despite drought and famine conditions.

10.4.1 Forecasting

Earlier and more precise knowledge of upcoming crop disasters could undoubtedly have accelerated donor action. The needs of a country can be assessed before the onset of the rainy season in terms of such factors as food availability, health and nutrition status of its residents, and mobility of its various population groups. When assessment shows that a country has significant needs before the rainy season, it is at-risk and should be carefully monitored. Lack of rain for such a country means no alternative food sources for its people. By contrast,

there can be less concern about a country that has foodstocks available that its population can draw upon if rains fail and current crops are lost. Furthermore, greater knowledge of agroclimatic relationships might permit informed decisions to be made concerning the best time to plant and harvest, thus avoiding waste of seed, agricultural inputs, and scarce water. It might also permit more timely measures to be taken to smooth supply and price fluctuations, resulting in better food supply policies by African governments and the donor community.

To become part of the total development process, forecasting systems should become primarily the responsibility of the African governments and their regional organizations. Nonetheless, host countries may still require assistance over a prolonged period in aspects of such a system that surpass their technical and financial capabilities. Establishing or strengthening on-the-ground reporting capabilities requires directives from the central government to the various levels of local authorities down to the smallest hamlet. All levels must be mobilized to collect regular countrywide agricultural and socioeconomic data that can serve as input to development projects and as early warning indicators.

The Food for Peace Office (FFP) in AID has sponsored the development of a food needs assessment methodology that combines a food needs balance sheet with software to analyze the inputs. The approach has been applied in Niger and Mozambique, among others, with useful results. AID will sponsor a workshop in Abidjan in September 1986 to share the assessment methodology with representatives of other African countries.

10.4.2 The Ethiopian Model

From an organizational standpoint, Ethiopia's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission can serve as the prototype of an indigenous system. It is intended both to manage logistics for relief supplies and to integrate early warning information. Monthly crop information (e.g., what has been planted, losses encountered) is sent from each village to the Commission. When preliminary information from the field indicates that crops are being lost in an area with existing food deficits, specialists are sent in to assess the extent of such losses and to estimate the number of people affected in order to determine the level of assistance required. Demographic data are also received from the Central Statistical Office, which has 500 enumerators and 112 supervisors in 12 different areas; the National Meteorologic Office, with 30 stations reporting daily; and the Ministry of Agriculture, which gets information from its numerous extension agents. Other reporting agencies are the Agricultural Marketing Corporation, the Ministry of Information, and the rural students and teachers of the Ministry of Education.

Despite the variety of information sources, evaluation of the extent of the problem is complicated. Although it may not be

easy to determine the extent of crop damage or crop loss, it is very difficult to determine how many people are at risk as a result. The problem is compounded by nomadic herders and usually stationary groups that move in search of new food sources after traditional sources have been exhausted.

10.4.3 Regional Organizations and Host Countries

In order to eventually "Africanize" the early warning systems, special consideration should be given to involving regional organization receiving stations such as the Interstate Committee for the Fight Against Drought (CILSS)/Agrhymet and IGAAD in the high-technology phases of the systems. Donors must ensure that their activities are not perceived by the African governments as efforts to impose a system on them. Host countries must feel that donors are assisting their initiatives, not that they are being called on to assist donors' projects.

USAID Missions should continuously stress the dual importance of early warning systems in development planning and famine prevention. These points should become primary agenda items in the ongoing policy dialogue with the host country.

To help guide efforts to equip African countries to deal with recurrent droughts and avoid famines or reduce their impacts, two studies should be conducted. One should focus on African countries that successfully handled the extreme drought that led to famine in so many countries. Likely candidates include Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Kenya. Additional insights into what works in Africa can be provided by a study of African countries that were able to produce surpluses during the very time when so many countries were experiencing famine.

10.5 Local Disaster Preparedness

Action Recommendations:

1. Host governments should, as a matter of high priority, design their own disaster preparedness plans, perhaps building on the existing local Red Cross/Crescent Chapters.
2. Offers of preparedness assistance by specialized organizations such as Licross, the U.N. Disaster Relief Office, and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees should be utilized, when possible, in preference to the commitment of scarce U.S. resources.
3. Preparedness plans should include standby food-for-work projects. USAID Missions should monitor their design (the U.N. World Food Program [WFP])

experience in Bangladesh could be pertinent).

4. USAID Missions should insist on the importance of preparedness in policy dialogues with their host country.

Host governments at all levels must become engaged in standby plans for various disaster contingencies. Emphasis should be on preventing recurrent droughts from turning into famines. Most of the famine-stricken countries lacked effective local relief systems. In many cases, PVOs made an enormous difference by enabling the survival of large numbers of people at risk.

Disaster preparedness frequently can be delegated, at least partially, to countrywide organizations such as the Red Cross/Crescent. Such an organization is generally headed by local dignitaries and, thus, indirectly but closely linked to the authorities. Governments, however, must retain ultimate responsibility for preparedness and need to be encouraged to exercise it. The U.N. Disaster Relief Office and Licross/Geneva as well as a number of national Licross Chapters have expressed readiness to detail experts to assist African governments in setting up disaster preparedness plans, training personnel, and, above all, institutionalizing the effort. Thus, AID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance can concentrate its preparedness assistance on countries that do not have access to other qualified donors.

Host governments and donors in drought-prone countries should prepare standby plans involving food-for-work projects that can be activated in emergencies. Activities chosen should strengthen ongoing relief efforts (e.g., road maintenance) and thus serve also as early recovery projects. USAID Missions should closely monitor this phase of preparedness. WFP's extensive experience in stand-by food-for-work projects (e.g., in Bangladesh) should be tapped. USAID Missions should insist on the vital importance of proper preparedness plans and organizations that can be activated on short notice. Host governments and donors should continuously remind themselves that a high state of readiness can help to prevent droughts from turning into famines.

10.6 Longer Range Development

Action Recommendations:

1. As soon as emergency conditions are over, development plans should be reviewed to ensure that first priority is placed on "drought and famine proofing." Highest emphasis should be given to food production projects.
2. To ensure survival of donor-supported activities

in host countries, AID (and other donors) should insist that they become fully integrated into the public service and the operating budget prior to project termination.

3. Assistance levels for drought-prone countries should take into consideration the degree of a country's priority on anti-drought/famine measures.
4. African governments should review laws and regulations that impeded relief operations and the need for standby authorities. An African organization should convoke meetings to resolve regional issues.

10.6.1 Relief Constraints

The emergency relief phases highlighted weaknesses in the physical infrastructures of drought-prone countries: lack of access roads to remote parts of the country; poorly maintained roads or roads with inadequate crests, culverts, ditches, or bridges; lack of construction, repair, and maintenance equipment and of technical personnel; insufficient storage facilities; and scarcity of transport assets. AID should assess the feasibility of supporting selected high-priority infrastructure projects only after determining that other donor support cannot be marshaled.

Other constraints resulted from the lack of standby legislation that would permit governments to deal effectively with unions, rate and fee structures, and a host of other regulations in times of crisis. Countries should review the legislative and regulatory blocks that hampered recent relief operations in order to identify the (additional) standby authorities that might be needed in similar emergencies. This might involve contingency arrangements with the private sector (e.g., warehousing and trucking interests, unions).

Several important issues are regional in nature, such as priorities in port areas for emergency shipments to landlocked countries, documentation requirements, border formalities, and fees. Organizations such as the Organization of African Unity, the Economic Commission of West African States, CILSS, and the Economic Community of West Africa appear ideally suited for the sponsorship of meetings to achieve the needed compacts. Such actions would underline intra-African cooperation and self-help efforts.

10.6.2 Antifamine Planning

The donor community and, generally, host governments are well aware of these deficiencies. Rather than returning to the

normal development plans and modes that had been interrupted by the crisis, governments should rethink their development strategies. Each ministry should incorporate remedial measures for sectors under its responsibility into its budget submission. Donors should relate their assistance programs to these efforts of the host government rather than go back "to development as usual." AID's Sahel Development Program, launched after the 1973-1974 Sahel famine and still ongoing, is one model of targeted development.

USAID Missions should review their Country Development Strategy Statements and Actions Plans in the light of recent drought experiences. Assistance to projects that will help to prevent famine by ensuring that recurrent droughts do not again reach the famine stage should take precedence over more classic development projects.

On the assumption that AID will continue to consider self-help efforts as an important criterion in justifying specific aid levels, the degree of a country's willingness to employ scarce resources to overcome constraints to famine relief should be given special weight. Young governments have generally both short attention spans and limited resources. They may find it difficult to maintain the priority focus on famine prevention, particularly when no disaster threatens and the last one becomes a dimming memory. The donor community must act as the advocate of those potentially at risk in a famine.

10.6.3 Emphasis on Agricultural Development

Experts believe that the immediate development thrust should aim at improving yields and production, especially of food crops; restoring and increasing on-farm and government security stocks; and rebuilding herds. In the immediate post-crisis period, efforts in the socioeconomic sector -- according to these specialists -- should take a back seat to agricultural production. Proponents of the priority focus on agriculture argue that among life's many priorities, a reasonably full stomach ranks first. Without sufficient food, even the healthiest and best educated person is doomed.

Projects, generally, must respond to local needs, tap local resources, and involve and be sustainable by the populations themselves. Farmers must be persuaded to stress traditional food crops, especially millet and cassava, rather than cash crops. They must see solutions as being in their self-interest rather than in that of government authorities and donors.

10.6.4 Population Pressures

One issue that is frequently given insufficient attention is the high birthrate and the related increases in the food gap as the population increases and per capita agricultural production

stagnates or declines. Clearly, family planning and related socioeconomic programs merit high priority attention by the African countries and fullest support by the donor community, especially AID with its long and expert involvement in this field. Again, the ongoing policy dialogue (with support from PLATO-type exhibits on population trend projections) should be used to impress on a country's political and intellectual elites and its population as a whole the effects of population increases when they outstrip the rate of agricultural and socio-economic progress.

10.6.5 Institutionalizing Project Activities

Experience shows that most donor-sponsored projects do not survive unless they have been institutionalized within the government's public service and regular budget by the time donor support terminates. Thus, AID and other donor support for activities to prevent future famine conditions should stipulate the following:

1. Activities involving government personnel will be integrated into the public service and their costs will be included in the regular operating budget.
2. The government will make progressively increasing contributions from regular operating budget funds during the project. Upon termination of the donor's support, the government's budget will have assumed all recurrent salary and other operating and capital costs.
3. If AID counterpart funds are made available for such activities, it is important that they be channeled through the regular budget or that the government agree to use regular budget funds for these projects. The local currency funds may be used for other budget items (that are not part of the USAID program) as offset. It is especially important that activities that the government may consider of lesser priority than donors (AID) over the longer run (or in the absence of an early emergency) become fully institutionalized.

10.6.6 Reward for Self-Help Measures

In allocating its resources, AID (and other donors) should consider a country's willingness to give priority to "drought and famine-proofing" measures, an important demonstration of self-help. The degree of effort should be a criterion in setting the country's aid level. This could serve as a major consideration in policy dialogues with those governments. Host country policymakers, in deciding how to allocate their own budgets, may opt to finance projects that can command donor support.

10.7 An International Approach to Famine Prevention

Action Recommendation: To provide for a concerted, long-range developmental attack on the causes of famine in Africa and to lessen the burden on individual donors, an international task force should be established under the aegis of the World Bank or the U.N. Secretary-General. The task force should be composed of African and donor government representatives, private experts, and representatives of governments that have been successful in combatting famine in their own countries.

Emergency famine assistance and famine prevention are analogous to emergency hospital treatment of accidental injuries and efforts to prevent accidents. Although more complex and interrelated than the causes of accidental injury, the causes of famine can be identified: population growth outstripping increases in agricultural production, desertification, civil strife, poor economic policies and agricultural practices, lack of reserve food stocks or the foreign exchange with which to purchase food during droughts, maldistribution of available food, failure to heed warning signs of impending disaster, and general lack of concern or preparedness. The cost of treatment in both cases is enormous. Over \$5 billion was spent on this African famine crisis by the donor community to save lives and prevent the spread of famine to those at risk; add to this the economic costs resulting from death, malnutrition, disabilities, and the disruption to the economy and development plans, and the total is staggering.

Concentration on increased safety measures has cut down the relative number of accidental injuries and their ultimate costs; efforts by donors in the last 20 years have helped to ameliorate the famine aftermath of droughts in Africa. In the case of famines, no single donor, no matter how affluent, can afford to maintain the necessary emergency facilities between droughts, which appear to be occurring more frequently. Several issues must be resolved. For example, should AID maintain a transport and logistics capability when it no longer engages in substantial infrastructure development? Is it feasible to station an FFP officer in each drought-prone country in Africa "just in case"? If it is deemed necessary to have a standby unit to avoid the sudden gearing up that an emergency often requires, should it be an integral unit within AID at all, given budgetary constraints and the major job of development facing AID around the world? Is even the development of a separate famine early warning system within AID an appropriate use of funds?

No single donor can afford to adequately address the myriad causes of famine. Three reports of recent meetings of governments and others concerned with the prevention of another such crisis in Africa shed light on the magnitude and complexity

of what is really a long-range development problem, which requires immediate and substantial funding.

The first was a report by the group of experts on aid to Africa appointed by the Bonn Economic Summit (September 9, 1985). Their core recommendations touched on the following:

- Collaboration with African countries and international organizations to improve early warning systems and distribution of emergency food supplies
- Assistance to African governments to improve transport systems
- Formulation and implementation of agriculture and food policies that would give priority to smallholder farmers, particularly women
- Improved international assistance on long-term agricultural research, with emphasis on measures to prevent further environmental degradation
- Human resources development, including a consideration of the impacts of population growth, rapid urbanization, and food security

The experts proposed a multifaceted program in all these areas, many in cooperation with CILSS and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference. No price tag was attached to the proposed action.

The second report was authored jointly by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity and the Conference of Ministers of the Economic Commission for Africa who convened in extraordinary session in Addis Ababa on March 29-31, 1986. (The material presented here is from a synopsis of that report prepared by the Hunger Project, May 13, 1986.) The full report was submitted to the special session of the U.N. General Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa, May 27-31, 1986. The report put forward a plan of action entitled, "Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, 1986-1990 (APPER)." The conclusions include the following:

- Rehabilitation and development of agriculture is of the highest priority; there is an urgent need to take fundamental measures to deal with the problems of drought and desertification and efficient development and utilization of human resources.
- The international community should now look beyond the emergency and supplement the domestic efforts currently being made to achieve a lasting solution.
- The support of the international community should go beyond the mere flow of financial resources and address exogenous factors such as elimination of tariff

barriers; commodity price instabilities; shortfalls in export earnings; problems of processing, marketing, distributing, and transporting commodities; and relief from foreign debt burdens.

- An estimated \$128.1 billion is needed to finance APPER for 1986-1990, of which \$82.5 billion will be raised by African governments from domestic resources. The external requirement (35.6 percent) is \$45.6 billion, an annual average of \$9.1 billion.
- Emphasis should be on strengthening existing institutions rather than creating new ones.
- External financing should come from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank (particularly through the International Development Association), the African Development Bank Group, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the U.N. system, and bilateral donors.

The third report, by the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa, strongly endorsed the principles in the APPER report. The U.N. draft report (May 31, 1986) details action proposals in agriculture, transport and communication, trade and finance, drought and desertification, human resources development, policy reforms, population policy, and women in development. Emphasis is also placed on subregional concerns, particularly in drought-prone areas.

All three reports, while stressing the problems inherent in the recent droughts, view those problems as requiring solutions not in isolation but as part of the longer range, deep-seated development concerns facing the continent. The projected \$128 billion cost reinforces this conclusion.

Although these reports may help to increasingly focus the efforts of African governments and the international community on long-range development problems, it seems important that a separate, shorter range effort focus on problems more closely identified with the causes of famine. Many will be allayed through long-term development programs, but others could succumb to intense efforts in the short term.

An international task force should be established under appropriate leadership to attack these unique problems. If the U.N. Office of Emergency Operations in Africa (UNOEOA) were a permanent agency, it would be an ideal choice based on its experience with the drought crisis and its close ties with other U.N. agencies. Instead, either the World Bank or a special assistant to the U.N. Secretary-General for African famine prevention should assume the leadership role.

The World Bank enjoys a general reputation of excellence; its staff is experienced in all facets of development around the world, as witnessed by its long and successful leadership of an

international consortium of donors developing the Indus Basin in Pakistan and India. Its Board of Directors represents the interests of the Third World as well as those of the donor countries that contribute to its funding. It has encouraged research in a multitude of development disciplines. A recent World Bank (1984) publication on the problems in Sub-Saharan Africa could well provide preliminary guidelines for the efforts of a famine prevention task force.

African countries and institutions must of course be adequately represented on the task force along with donor countries and representatives of governments that have successfully overcome many of the same kinds of problems that face Africa (India, for example, with its "green revolution" success). The private sector should be well represented, particularly organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation. According to the May 4, 1986 New_York_Times, the Rockefeller Foundation announced a doubling of its aid to the Third World, with special emphasis on Sub-Saharan Africa. Subgroups could be formed to attack specific problems and submit recommendations for their solution to the task force. Given the abundance of the harvest this year, resulting in a continentwide surplus, one of the first recommendations should suggest how that surplus could be made available to those areas and people yet in need.

One objection to the World Bank's leadership of such a task force is its overriding involvement in worldwide development problems, an involvement that may dilute the time and energy it could lend to this effort. An appropriate alternative to the World Bank -- but without the access to the World Bank's resources -- is the Office of the U.N. Secretary-General. It was that office that created UNOEOA and gave it the authority to coordinate the efforts of other U.N. entities during the famine relief efforts. One of the former senior officers of the UNOEOA could be named as a special assistant to the Secretary-General for African famine prevention, bringing to that position the experience and knowledge gained from the UNOEOA operation. The importance of the Secretary-General's office would be key to coordinating the efforts of the myriad entities that would constitute the task force.

It is recommended that the United States and other donor countries and organizations work with African governments to prepare a concerted approach to the World Bank or the Secretary-General to undertake the sponsorship of such an effort. Clearly, the funding will be shared by all concerned, but it should prove to be a relatively small percentage of the billions spent by the world in 1984-1986 to overcome the impact of famine in Africa.

EPILOGUE

The United States was the lead donor in the famine relief effort, providing on average 50 percent of the food assistance judged to be needed over 3 fiscal years. The dollar value of

total U.S. assistance was over \$2 billion. This report concentrates on what can be improved when the United States responds to the next famine disaster and what can be done between crises to prepare African countries and reduce the severity of the next crisis.

The U.S. Government response, spearheaded by AID, and the contributions of other donors and countless private voluntary organizations helped avert a tragedy of monumental proportions in Africa. Although many died, many more were spared through a massive outpouring of assistance from sources around the world.

Text for Appendix A missing

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